Talibans Military Successes
(Sep-Oct 2000)
By
General Mirza Aslam Beg
Rising from the soil of Kandahar some five years back, the
Taliban have effected a heroic feat of establishing their sway
almost over the entire territories of Afghanistan. The operations
conducted by them have proved so over-powering that foreign interventions
and support to the inimical forces fell apart and proved of
no avail. The Taliban, who were taken to be novices in the art
of warfare, have simply baffled military analysts by executing
a strategy which proved instrumental in achieving astounding
successes. It therefore merits a dispassionate analysis and I
shall attempt to discuss their fighting acumen, as it unfolds
itself over a five-year period.
First Phase
After having established their control over the territories
of Kandahar, Ghazni and Jalalabad in 1997, they swept over the
North-Western areas of Herat and consolidated their hold over
whole of western Afghanistan and succeeded in blocking the Afghan-Iran
border, which provided the most serious threat of intervention.
Despite this, Iran continued its support and Tajikistan was used
as the conduit to the anti-Taliban forces in the North, particularly
in Mazar-i-Sharif and Hazarajat areas. Thus the Northern Alliance
of anti-Taliban forces was further beefed up by Russia, India,
Tajikistan and Uzbekistan.
Second Phase
In June 1998, the Taliban made advances towards Mazar-i-Sharif
and Hazarajat, and within a short period of five months, gained
total control over these areas. This victory brought in its wake
a state of disarray among the elements of the Northern Alliance,
and Ahmad Shah Massoud had to assume its leadership. Due to continued
foreign intervention, resistance against Taliban became formidable.
The City of Kulyab, in Tajikistan was developed as the facilitating
supply base of arms, equipment and logistics. Ahmad Shah Massoud,
was thus able to establish his hold from Punjsher Valley with
North of Kabul to that of Qunduz bordering with Tajikistan and
the whole of eastern Afghanistan practically became his domain.
He neither lacked weapons to fight nor resources to sustain his
forces. It was indeed a great dilemma for Taliban, to cope up
with this exigency.
Third Phase
In May 2000, the Taliban offensive in the North of Kabul
in the area of Punjsher Valley met tough resistance from Ahmad
Shah Massoud. Taliban suffered heavy losses in men and material.
More than four hundred soldiers lost their lives. The set-back
induced the Taliban to retreat towards Baghlan, and initiate
a new grouping, and a new strategy.
Around the middle of September, the Taliban embarked upon
a deep turning movement, which could appropriately be termed
a Strategy of Indirect Approach. Through this maneuver towards
the north, starting from the west and covering a distance of
nearly 300 kilometers, over very difficult terrain, they were
able to capture the sensitive areas of Nehreen, Barkeh and Eshkashem.
As a result of this maneuver, the Northern Alliance was deprived
of their strategic routes of supply from Tajikistan. After a
pause of two weeks, a new offensive was launched from two directions,
i.e., Qunduz and Peshkan which enabled them to capture the crucial
area of Talkan, which facilitated the fall of Khawaj-i-Ghar,
Imam Sahib, Dalishat Artashi, and the important reverine port
of Sher Khan, by the middle of October 2000. The Taliban were
thus fully saddled in these areas and Ahmad Shah Massoud had no
option left but to fall back and shift his military headquarters
to Baharak, in the Badakhshan province. The Northern Alliance,
having lost three important supply routes, now have only two
supply routes to Eshkashem and Darwez, which pass over very difficult
terrain.
The victories of Taliban, have practically shattered
the defense line of the Northern Alliance. The operations so
conducted by the Taliban in the given time and space dimensions,
were characterized by deep out-flanking maneuvers, to isolate
the most dangerous opposition first, while containing the future
enemy to be dealt with later; giving pauses to recoup and reorganize;
effecting tactical withdrawals, followed by deep turning movements,
thus forcing the enemy to fight on reverse fronts, and winning
battles without fighting, such as the battle for Punjsher Valley.
It is proved beyond doubt that Taliban do not need lessons to
operationalize their military strategy as reflected in this map.
(editor's note: the map provided by General Beg was done by
hand and may be confusing. We have enhanced it in color to help
clarify his main points. )
Taliban are now preparing to march on to capture the strategic
areas of Feyzabad so that Ahmad Shah Massoud is deprived of the
supply routes of Darwaz and Eshkashem. The valley of Punjsher
is practically under siege and the Taliban may move towards Sehra-e-Minjan,
to win the battle without fighting.
Analysis
The military victory of Taliban has now induced Russia,
Iran and Tajikistan to plan a counter strategy at Dushanbe, but
the fact is that the Taliban now enjoy superior strategic orientation,
which cannot be denied to them by Ahmad Shah Massoud, who lacks
space and external support. Russo-Iran Afghan policy has
fumbled and the irony is that Pakistan is being scapegoated for
this failure. Both Tajikistan and Uzbekistan having supported
the Northern Alliance are now conscious of the inevitable fate,
and are visibly making overtures towards establishing friendly
relations with Afghanistan. Uzbekistan is expected to initiate
a conciliatory dialogue and has resolved to open its borders
for trade with Afghanistan, which indeed is a sagacious step.
In Tajikistan there are around twenty five thousand Russian soldiers
deployed on the borders, yet when the Taliban were able to capture
Bandar Sher Khan, the Russian soldiers kept a safe distance and
avoided facing the Taliban forces. Following the lead from Uzbekistan,
Tajikistan may be well advised to open its frontiers for trade
with Afghanistan.
Pakistan is unnecessarily being blamed for aiding Afghan
Mujahideen, when, in fact, Pakistan itself is undergoing worst
conceivable crisis of its history. In fact it was in 1989, when
Pakistan had fully dissociated itself from meddling into the
internal affairs of Afghanistan, after the failure of the Jalalabad
Operation. What has come to surface, is that the new Taliban
strategy has very little congruence with Pakistanís military
thought or training, yet the blood is thicker than water, and
the bond that exists between the people of these two neighboring
countries, will continue to determine the contours of the future
strategic consensus in the region. In moments of peril, it is
the people to people relationship which matters and not formal
diplomatic relations at state level.
China is a well-trusted friend of Afghanistan and is
deeply valued. There is a phenomenal development which China
has brought into its Mid-West area. Similarly the war-ravaged
Afghanistan must also receive its due attention, as the people
have crossed the threshold of endurance, misery and hardships.
China undoubtedly can play a vital role in the healing of their
wounds.
The failure of US Afghan policy came to light, when
in the wake of Russian defeat in 1989, USA became totally indifferent
to this country, as if it had played no role in humbling Soviet
Union. USA was not inclined to let the so-called radical forces
to assume political power in Afghanistan. As a consequence, Afghanistan
was kept bleeding through internal feuds and infighting. Its
economy was totally shattered. When the chaos became unbearable,
the Afghan soul got ultimately stirred up and Taliban emerged
as a force to frustrate the designs of the divisive forces. Pakistan,
Saudi Arabia and UAE recognized the Taliban Government, whereas
for the rest of the civilized world, Afghanistan remained a symbol
of fanaticism and bigotry. USA has created in Osama Bin Laden
a controversial figure, and has pegged its Afghan policy on him,
which has dangerous portents not only for the Afghan people but
for the entire region. Rumors are rampant that USA is contemplating an
attack on Afghanistan, which does not speak well of US strategic
vision. It appears that desperation has blurred the vision.
Pakistanís Afghan policy has had many ups and
downs, as it was never structured on sound pragmatic lines. At
state level, there exist misgivings and misunderstanding but
the people of these two countries are interwoven in deep ties.
It was a sound gesture on the part of the Nawaz Sharif government
to recognize Taliban government but the policy remained rather
circumscribed due to expediency and as a consequence the major
objectives could not be achieved. It is now imperative to formulate
a new diplomatic strategy in light of the realities that exist
today.
The Northern Alliance, after its defeat, is in a state
of quandary. The Punjsher Valley is now rendered weak and fragile,
and if there is an encounter with Taliban, the existing prosperity
of this valley would be ruined. Ahmad Shah Massoud is in no position
to come to their rescue. It would be prudent to seek accommodation
and reconciliation with Taliban. The failure of the Northern
Alliance is essentially a failure of foreign interference, which
started with Russian involvement in 1979 and now is closeted
at Dushanbe. In fact, the party is over, yet, if the opposition
chooses to operate in the mountainous areas of Badakhshan, it
would be a futile venture. Therefore, it is time that Northern
Alliance, initiate a dialogue with Taliban, which would fetch
them what is their due. Taliban are large-hearted people and
would surely share governance with the Northern Alliance leaders.
Taliban have resolutely stood to achieve dignity and
freedom and have proved beyond doubt that if the nation is prepared
to face the challenges Strategic Defiance as an instrument of
politico-military policy, serves the interest of the country,
best to achieve the core sentiments. They have mastered a strategy
of warfare, which indeed is their own accomplishment. Being economically
impoverished, and encountering intrigues from many quarters,
their endurance is a rich tribute to human courage, which flows
from Faith. Someone rightly said: "It is courage the world
needs, not infallibility. Courage is always the surest wisdom."
Afghan character is the epitome of that wisdom.
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