by David Dienstag 10/09

  We were there on election night for that exultant party that poured into the streets of Washington DC full of joy and hope. Régime ancien was gone and so was it's failure and hatred. Spontaneous crowds filled the streets and marched down to the White House to take it back. Before their demise, the Bush party didn't bother to call out their dogs on us; they merely turned out the White House lights. No one in the crowd cared, we had light of our own and we savored the moment for all it was worth. And it was worth a lot. We glowed all the way to the inauguration. We shined for new President who embodies our hopes, dreams and ideals. We had the parting shot of Cheney, twisted by his darkness and hate mongering, being sent off in a wheel chair. Could there have been a better picture? But rather than gloat, we pushed on to a new day.

The sense of America being cornered by bigoted stupidity of it's own leadership was gone as if an iron curtain had been lifted and we were ready to roll up our sleeves and face the tasks, hardships and mistakes ahead. No one expected an easy time of it, not even that night; but who were we to dare predict the future? The very question made our toasts go down more smoothly. It took about two weeks for the dreamy mist of that night's victory to burn off and when we awoke, the hatred and stupidity was hopefully gone but the greed and ambition was still there. You simply had to squint to see it. Even though it feels like staring at the sun with a hangover, Jezail never lost sight of the fact that America's foreign policy machinery doesn't change much with new administrations. We may have been in denial for a few shots of Dutch courage but those of us who watch South Asia from a safe distance understood the dangerous momentum of policy and it has little to do with left or right, Democrat or Republican points of view...

At Jezail, we never lost sight of the fact that no more American troops or money are going to solve the problems of the AF-PAK theater. We know because, as young men, we toted guns with those boys in the hills. It was the Afghans who beat the Russians, not Charlie Wilson or his false bravado. We were with the Afghans from the battle fields, to the UN, to the US Congress. We know from experience that our military is not capable of the job. We also know that our State Department is also not up to the tasks either. The cumbersome bureaucracies themselves are not. The cultures, career paths and general orientation of these organizations' personnel render them incapable of doing what is necessary and the time to do those things that had to be done has come and gone. It has taken these two bureaucracies the better part of a decade to understand that they have a problem at the Durand line. But they still expect Americans to trust Pakistan's word and intentions and to act as "anvil". Our foreign policy stewards still haven't come to grips with the real string pullers of Ossama, the Taliban, Lashkar and both versions of the old Hezbi Islami. That would be the Pakistani intelligence services and the Punjabi racket hiding behind the veil of Pakistani civil government. The ocean liners of American foreign policy still don't, or refuse to understand the political relationships in Pakistan or Afghanistan. They can only ask for more. The Pentagon wants more soldiers and the State Department wants to give away more money. They don't mind if they squander an American Presidency to get what they want. They haven't since Vietnam. It's an institutional behavior. When the smoke clears, watch as select four star generals and supercrats leave government to work for those interests that make the real gains and profits from the AF-PAK mess. Ironically, the Pakistani people don't seem to want more American aid. Get the message? An inconvenient truth is that simply throwing money at corrupt regimes in South Asia will not accomplish policy objectives.

As it stands, there are a lot of things America can't do after 8 years. Chief among them are:

1. We can't eliminate or neutralize Pakistani nukes.
2. We can't stand up a popular government in Afghanistan.
3. We can't get Ossama or eliminate Al Queda.
4. We can't beat our adversaries militarily.
5. We can't find a reliable ally on any border.

Additionally, the US military has a record of failure fighting counter insurgencies. Nor has any one stated, what is to Jezail, painfully obvious; the supply line is about as over extended as it can be - on the other side of the planet. Maintaining it will be politically and financially expensive and vulnerable. If the Obama White House wants health care reform and all of the other domestic policy initiatives they campaigned for, how can they pay for this, as well as an expanded counter insurgency? Jezail confidently predicts that the diplomats will want ever more money and the generals will want more soldiers and weapons. They may all have new plans and they will all fail.

Right now, Americans are confronted with a false choices, stay or go, target Al Queda only or conduct a wider counter insurgency. These ideas are not the only options on the menu and are, in reality, empty talking points from "experts" sourced from historic failures from Vietnam to Iraq. What they consistently failed to see is that we had friends in Afghanistan by virtue of the natural forces of geography, demography and history. But so far, the chief ethnic group that America's intelligence "experts" have come to recognize are the Pashto who we either attempt to deal with "moderate" factions of (usually by attempting to buy them) or not. They forget the late Loius Dupree's warning: "you can't buy an Afghan; you can only rent him". This myopia is a result of the sad fact that the view points and diplomatic reports coming into the White House are figuratively viewing Afghanistan from Islamabad as they always have. Yet American leadership continues to be snookered by Pakistan and can't understand why. The answer is very simple, they have historically relied on Pakistanis to explain the ground situation to them because American diplomats can't go anywhere without a heavy security detail and historically have been uninclined to get out of their air conditioned bubble.

Perhaps emblematic of this, America now has Robin Raphel as our latest regional "old hand" and a deputy to Mr. Holbrook. She is waftinging in with a 1.5 billion dollar "aid" package (S.962: Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act 20009) from the US that was instantly rejected on the Pakistani street. She had been a Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs beginning in 1993 and on her watch, the Madrassas bloomed. Robin Raphel is the person who squired Taliban officials around Washington as the next best hope for Afghan leadership. Ms. Raphel went from there to lobbying for the dubious and ill fated UNOCAL pipe line project. She eventually became a lobbyist at Cassidy & Associates for the government of Pakistan. She was responsible for lobbying for Islamabad in the state department as a registered foreign agent of Pakistan bringing in a $1.2 million contract for Cassidy & Associates. What smell test does this pass? At this time, Jezail sees this as a highly dubious appointment of a well known revolving door retread to a sensitive position. She is very personification of checkbook diplomacy and that is the last thing Americans need right now. And instantly, it's failing and provoking street demonstrations in Pakistan.

Efforts to increase aid, as well as the footprint of the U.S. Embassy and security contractors, are aggravating tensions and causing protests in Islamabad. The United Nations World Food Program office in Islamabad has been bombed, killing 5 people and more bombings are expected. That is very likely because the Pakistani Military is not to be a recipient of the aid. Civil programs, likely to shure up the civilian government are objectionable to ISI Islamist chauvinists as well as in the Army. So they have unleashed their Pashto extremist mercenaries to kill again as they have so many times before. At the same time, the Pakistani street seems to have signaled to America that it is choking on American "aid".

What no one seems to want to understand is that we had natural friends in the region. They were the smaller, more isolated minorities across Afghanistan and Pakistan. We still have a regional contradiction that works in our favor and that is the Taliban itself. Their form of government is so brutal and imbecilic, it makes enemies without our help. Non Pashto Afghans will still fight against them. We can yield ground and take full advantage of that. But we give the Taliban a real advantage. The Taliban can credibly point to American aid and call it corruption. It is and has been for decades. Sadly, there is no longer much in the way of American foreign policy interests in the region to justify huge risks of American capitol and prestige. (Ms. Raphel won't tell you that.) Now it's Jezail's turn to remind State Department dons of the old saw that they wagged at us when we supported Mujaheddin against the Soviets: "Nations don't have friends; they have interests." No one wants to recognize that Pakistani regional interests and American regional interests are divergent.

Another thing no one wants to understand is that we can no longer talk about "Pakistan" as such. There are multiple political and ethnic constituencies that act as a federation sometimes together and sometimes apart and sometimes even murderously against each other. Islamabad hides that fact from the world and sends successive ambassadors who simply lie to reassure American leadership that sending more aid (money) is the solution to Pakistan's problems and is seen as an entitlement in Islamabad. Every one of them has maintained that these problems are an American creation stemming from the Soviet period of Afghan occupation. Now we see that 1.5 billion dollars in aid that is intended for civilian projects is resented on the Pakistani street. Daring to suggest that we verify that the aid money doesn't go into the mists of corruption is mind bendingly regarded as a threat to Pakistani sovereignty. The Pakistani street logic of blaming the United States for Taliban bombing is about to kick in again.

What are we doing? Is this another war to force people to like us? It occurs to Jezail that propping up Pakistan is a well worn and bad path. The argument is made that Pakistani nukes will fall into the wrong hands. It occurs to Jezail that the Pakistani nukes are already in the wrong hands. (It must be pointed out that the Pakistani nuclear program was allowed to blossom as American aid to the Pakistani military poured in unconditionally over a number of US administrations.) The simple fact is that the American foreign policy apparatus insists that anything that the United States attempts to do in South Asia has to go through Pakistan approval which has to be purchased. This has been the case since the early 1980's. It has consistently been wrong and our foreign policy dons refuse to accept that. What is likely to happen in this situation is that the Pakistani military will engineer another crisis and demand more aid which they regard as an entitlement.

Jezail believes that Pakistani instability is carefully orchestrated theater. It is designed to shake loose more American money for the military. Moreover, Jezail believes that if the Taliban is going to take over the country, let them. Let the Punjabis and Mojahirs, so adept at averting responsibility for their own actions and so skilled at finger pointing, live under their Taliban version of Sharia law they prescribe for Afghanistan. At least then, America will finally know who our friends aren't.