Federation for American Afghan Action

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PURPOSE

1) To pressure the U.S. government into adopting an effective strategy in Afghanistan by developing a sustainable legislative consensus on the necessity and the means to do so.
Federation for American Afghan Action

August 13, 1984
DALLAS, TEXAS

REMARKS OF ANDREW EIVA
TO THE
REPUBLICAN PLATFORM COMMITTEE'S
NATIONAL SECURITY SUBCOMMITTEE

Good morning, my name is Andrew Eiva. As executive director of the Federation for American Afghan Action, I represent the growing number of Americans who are demanding effective aid to the Afghan freedom fighters. Even though we were founded only last year, we have already been instrumental in the bipartisan introduction in both houses of Congress of legislation calling for effective aid to the Afghans, the first American legislation ever calling for support of a guerrilla movement. In addition, we are the driving force behind the congressional dissatisfaction with the current level of aid which resulted in the allocation of an additional fifty million dollars to the Afghan freedom fighters several weeks ago.

The additional allocation was necessary because the oft-reported $325 million already spent in the last few years by the U.S. has had minimal impact. Despite assurances from so-called "knowledgeable" sources in Washington that the pipeline to the Afghans is full, credible European and American observers in the field indicate that the types of aid reaching those we are committed to support are inadequate and of the wrong kind. Our Afghan friends, while appreciating the support, confirmed that the aid that has reached them was for the most part useless for their tasks.

This is not new. The United States has supported twelve arguably legitimate liberation movements since World War II: Albania, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, China, Sumatra, Tibet, Kurdistan (twice), Cuba, the Hmuong tribe in Laos, and Angola. All twelve have lost. Current bureaucratic performance in Afghanistan indicates Afghanistan is well on the way to becoming number 13 unless immediate drastic corrective action takes place. America's inability to support legitimate guerrilla movements since World War II represents de-facto unilateral disarmament in a capability that has accounted for most of the world's turf changes since World War II.
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Senator Paul Tsongas, who is leading the Senate effort for effective Afghan aid, has stated, "In Africa, whenever a leader was fighting for his freedom, the Soviets were always there with weapons and ideology." For the Soviets to be the champions of those fighting for their liberation while we end up on the side of oppressive regimes is one of history's tragic ironies, especially when it is our own belief in human rights and the dignity of man that distinguishes us from the Soviets.

Why has our country, conceived in insurgency, been so ineffective in supporting other men's struggles to be free? Several experiences have driven me to find the answer.

Born in a refugee camp in Germany of Lithuanian parents, the first five years of my life coincided with the last five years of the Soviet annihilation of the Lithuanian guerrilla movement, which "enjoyed" CIA support. At an age when most children were learning to read, I was learning about fouled up CIA bundle drops to Lithuanian guerrillas around the dinner table. Growing up in America, my political baptism came in 1964, when I discovered a paperback which struck directly at the underlying problem of American foreign policy, "Why Not Victory," by Barry Goldwater. My ensuing three years of conservative political activism culminated in my founding and leading the "Victory in Vietnam Committee" on my campus. We held the Students for a Democratic Society at bay for an entire year while the administration frittered away American blood, money, prestige, and my efforts in a no-win defensive war in Vietnam. I decided that the triumph of liberty could only be assured by offensive, not defensive action and I set out to figure out how to make it work, technically, strategically, and politically.

My quest took me to West Point where I graduated in 1972. I became a master parachutist, ranger, and a linguist. I commanded paratroopers in the 82nd Airborne Division and led a Special Forces "green beret" detachment specializing in Soviet weapons, tactics, and languages. In the mechanized infantry, I became expert with shoulder fired air defense weapons, mortars, heavy machine guns, anti-tank rockets, and the vulnerabilities of mechanized units.

After the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, I left the army, conducted my own assessment of the Afghan war, and decided our bureaucrats were on their way to another "no-win" fiasco. I spent the next several years educating myself on CIA covert operations in Afghanistan and elsewhere, training guerrillas, and organizing a program to encourage larger Soviet defections in Afghanistan. But my thoughts turned increasingly to America, which held the key to effective aid to the guerrillas and ultimately the only chance to halt the genocide of Afghanistan.

In between the last several trips, I approached my Senator, Paul Tsongas, to take the lead in addressing the key issue: "It would be indefensible to give the Afghans only enough to fight and die but not enough to advance their cause of freedom." To supplement Senator Tsongas' lead in Washington, Federation for
American Afghan Action has organized grass roots pressure throughout the country to support the legislation. The resulting congressional and grass roots dissatisfaction about the aid now reaching the Afghans has resulted in 69 Senate and 162 House cosponsors.

Our reports of ineffective aid in the field have also triggered an independent Pentagon assessment which has confirmed our devastating allegations concerning the ineffective aid reaching the guerrillas.

In the course of these experiences, I have had the opportunity to find out the five underlying factors now preventing the creation of an effective U.S./free world guerrilla warfare support capability.

First, no bureaucratic constituency currently exists for supporting guerrilla movements. Bureaucrats in the CIA's top echelons as well as the Pentagon’s top brass have always viewed the support of liberation movements as a distasteful diversion from their primary empire building activities. Guerrilla warfare support opens no new shipyards, large units, or new berths for general officers. Thus the top careerists in our national security establishment have had a vested interest in crushing, suppressing, or diverting previous efforts to create a capability to support guerrilla movements, even though such a capability would be an obvious extension of our American ideals, talents, and culture. For example, after the Bay of Pigs invasion, John F. Kennedy was so disgusted with the CIA's lies and mistakes that he sacked the top three officers and set out to develop an irregular warfare capability via the Special Forces, a new emphasis epitomized by the insignia on their new green berets, "De Oppresso Liber," Latin for liberate from oppression. But an assassin's bullet cut President Kennedy's dream short, and thenceforward the Green Berets were employed strictly to defend the status quo, a perversion epitomized by the deployment of a Special Forces Military Training Team to train Ton Ton Macoute capabilities to preserve Papa Doc's voodoo dictatorship against the desire of the people of Haiti to be free.

Second, the financial constituency for a guerrilla warfare support capability is negligible. Support for guerrilla operations is usually done with second hand surplus weapons. Except for a limited number of aircraft and high-tech electronics, it requires no new missile silos, military bases, munitions factories, shipyards, or tanks. By contrast, B-1 backers organized contractors, subcontractors, and other financial constituencies in almost fifty states to insure the adoption of the $20 billion system. Thus, the legislation demanding better aid for the Afghans moved from Massachusetts to Washington down Route 95 in a hitchhiker's backpack.

The third reason is the tendency of our bureaucrats to favor the status quo. This tendency is epitomized in the so-called Sonnenfeldt doctrine, named after a key Kissinger aide who explained to a group of assembled U.S. diplomats that it is in the interest of the United States to discourage efforts for
independence in East Europe. Although this doctrine is not an official U.S. policy, a declining number of government officials and members of the establishment still cling to it. Furthermore, the big banks have a vested interest of billions of dollars of loans invested in the survival of the Soviet empire, epitomized by American bankers calling for the disciplining of Polish workers during the heyday of the Polish Solidarity movement. Frequently, Washington careerists reinforce this status quo orientation by focusing their influence on key committee chairmen, co-opting senior legislators into cozy personal arrangements with overseas dictators.

The fourth reason is the bureaucratic malaise in the Directorate of Operations, the portion of the CIA tasked with the support guerrilla warfare. The Directorate of Operations differs from other Washington bureaucracies in its ability to maintain a thicker curtain of secrecy over its shenanigans. To understand what this really means, just think what the Pentagon would be paying for hammers if they were covert. Imagine what happens to any CIA officer who tries to improve things; if his oath and patriotism are not enough to keep him from going public, then the threat of destruction of his livelihood and systematic opprobrium by the intelligence community along with its establishment allies certainly will.

The fifth reason is that the American people are still unaware of the first four. In this political season, the Federation for American Afghan Action and its allies plan to educate the American people about the first four reasons placing our faith in the following Biblical injunction, "For every one who does evil hates the light, and does not come to the light lest his deeds be exposed. But he who does what is true comes to the light, that it may be clearly seen that his deeds have been wrought in God." [John 3:20-21]

While the Afghan resistance is caught in a vise between systematic Soviet annihilation and the covert "junk" the Mujahadeen have been receiving from the CIA, the institutions described in the first four reasons listed above have followed their bureaucratic tendencies down the path of least resistance to their logical conclusion. The Afghan related conduct of bureaucrats in the CIA, the Pentagon, and the State Department shows how bad bureaucratic conduct can get when money is thrown at them without insuring that our best national values are continuously asserted.

The CIA's Directorate of Operations has committed the following actions in the name of the Afghan freedom fighters:

1. The CIA has wrested from Congress what is probably its largest budget ever for a guerrilla support operation while keeping the quality and quantity of aid so low it condemns the Afghan resistance to a slow death while not provoking the Soviets. Several weeks ago, Congress threw another $50 million at the Directorate of Operations in addition to the estimated $325 million it already
spent on itself in the name of the Afghan freedom fighters.

2. The CIA has chosen to spend the taxpayers money to buy the SAM-7 air defense "weapon" for the freedom fighters, a weapon that had a MALFUNCTION RATE of 100 PERCENT!!! in its last guerrilla support operation in Angola. It has continued to deliver this weapon to the guerrillas for four years in spite of steady anguished reports from the field concerning its total ineffectiveness.

3. For four years the CIA has convinced top officials in the executive branch as well as key legislators what a wonderful operation it is conducting in Afghanistan while conducting a guerrilla support operation that is an insult to a heroic nation facing genocide.

4. This summer the CIA ran a self-promoting and misleading media blitz in Time and U.S. News and World Report magazines in an apparent attempt to deflect growing awareness of its disastrous performance in the field.

5. The CIA leaves the final deliveries of arms totally under Pakistani control, leaving the Pakistanis free to deliver the munitions in such a way that resistance groups suspiciously leap at each other's throats. Leaving the Pakistanis in charge in the field also makes the Pakistanis a handy scapegoat as the reports of the disastrous CIA performance begin to surface.

6. The aura of glamorous covert secrecy that the CIA has cultivated concerning the Afghan operation has been the key factor in gaining the entire CIA bureaucracy what is probably its biggest spending spree in its 37 year history.

The State Department has been no slouch, either. Its Afghan related actions reflect its institutional tendencies as follows:

1. The State Department has wrested a $3.2 billion aid package for the government of Pakistan, arming a military dictatorship and allowing it to postpone its day of reckoning with the rising discontent of its own people and insuring that the uprising will probably be an anti-American one when it comes.

2. The State Department has actively opposed the growing legislative effort to pass the Tsongas-Ritter resolution demanding effective aid to the resistance. State Department officials have actively worked to amend, delay, and actually kill the resolution, as epitomized by the testimony of Howard B. Schaeffer in secret session before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee this year.

3. The State Department set up secret private face to face sessions between Zia ul Haq, the dictator of Pakistan, and top congressional leaders in which they made cozy special arrangements which included a commitment by the congressmen to prevent passage of the Tsongas-Ritter resolution.
4. The State Department has pushed through a program to send 40 nuclear capable F-16 fighter bombers to Pakistan, in spite of the growing body of circumstantial evidence that Pakistan is accelerating its nuclear bomb program with Qaddafy financing. Qaddafy has already made a number of attempts to acquire a nuclear bomb to fulfill his dream of annihilating Israel. It is reasonable to assume his generous financial and material contributions to the nuclear program in Pakistan is related to this goal. The Pakistani officer corps is intensely anti-Semitic and one officer once bragged to me of a "secret plan to destroy Israel," although he refused to elaborate when I pressed for details.

5. The State Department has opposed efforts by Senators Cranston and Glenn to make certification that Pakistan has stopped building the bomb a prerequisite condition for continuation of the aid to Pakistan. Pakistan's role as a conduit of aid to the Afghan freedom fighters was the key to the one vote margin of survival for the delivery of nuclear capable F-16's to Pakistan in spite of the refusal of the executive branch to certify that the Pakistan had stopped building the bomb. Nevertheless, both the State Department and the CIA have refused to consider supplementary aid routes to Afghanistan that do not include tight official control, thus conveniently keeping the popular aid for the Afghans in one tight channel on which the State Department, Pakistan, and the CIA are free to charge multi-billion dollar tolls to the taxpayer in the name of the ever-popular Afghan freedom fighters.

The Pentagon bureaucracy has also responded to the Afghan crisis predictably, demonstrated by the following items of fact:

1. Although President Reagan directed the increase of America's ability to wage guerrilla warfare in 1981, the Pentagon bureaucracy subverted this directive so extensively that several months ago Pentagon official Noel Koch went public onto the pages of the New York Times to denounce the four years of bureaucratic disruption of the President's directive.

2. The ongoing Soviet annihilation of Afghanistan gave Pentagon bureaucrats an unusually free hand to allocate the defense budget in accordance with institutional priorities. This led to substantial acquisitions of major end items of a type generating profits without improving defense readiness as recent studies have begun to show.

Holding the Republican convention in Texas places near a shrine of American heroism that will help us understand both the tragedy and triumph of Afghanistan, the Alamo. At the Alamo, 186 men, led by legendary officers such as Davy Crockett, Jim Bowie, and Captain Travis made the conscious decision to refuse surrender and die to extract a debilitating price from the invading Mexicans and buy the rest of Texas the time it needed to organize an army to crush Santa Ana at San Jacinto. The heroism of those men has enriched the very soul of America and has etched itself indelibly into American cultural memory. Similarly, the 300 Spartans at Thermopylae also made a conscious decision that liberty is more precious than
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life and bought Greece the time it needed to mobilize to defeat the invading Persian hordes and save the cradle of democracy and western civilization. In Afghanistan, however, it is not just 186 Texans and Tennesseans, or 300 Spartans, but an entire nation that has consciously decided that liberty is more precious than life. They have held on just for several weeks, but for four brutal years against the murderous rage of a totalitarian technological superpower that has reduced the rapacious human spirit to a banal bureaucratic science that it practices against its own people as well as those abroad. A million Afghans have died in this lopsided struggle. In its scope, its duration, its uneven odds, and its valor, the Afghan epic dwarfs the most heroic legends of our civilization. It is no longer a test of the Afghans, however. They have fulfilled their responsibilities and are continuing to do so. It is our resolve and our values that are now being tested; do we have the moral courage, the initiative, to measure up? History will not forgive us if we fail.

Time is running out. Hundreds of Afghans die daily. The recent wave of bombings has driven a fresh flood of refugees off the countryside, accelerating the depopulation of the countryside that was already running at over a thousand a day for the past five years.

The performance of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) in supporting the Kachin people of Burma against the Japanese invaders in 1944-45 shows what is possible. Once the guerrilla support program was in place, 5447 Japanese regulars lost their lives in a few short months at a cost of only 70 Kachin guerrillas. Detachment 101, the unit responsible for the guerrilla support package, even received a Presidential Citation for their performance. In France, operation Jedburgh, involving a small guerrilla support cadre of several hundred Americans, British, and Frenchmen, effectively supported the maquis against the German occupation force, accounting for 42,000 German casualties.

Considering the miracles the Afghan guerrillas have accomplished with the minimal aid they now receive, imagine what they could do with a meaningful program!

The Kachin and Jedburgh examples show the critical role of political leadership in creating an effective guerrilla warfare support capability. Although the State Department and the War Department were both predictably hostile to the development of such a capability, President Franklin Roosevelt intervened directly and firmly to insure William Donovan's OSS became a reality.

The entrenched bureaucratic interests in Washington today do not have an interest in seeing effective guerrilla warfare support no matter how much money Congress throws at them. Only firm political leadership from the top will insure that a guerrilla warfare support capability becomes a reality. That is why I am asking you to endorse an effective guerrilla warfare support capability.

In 1943, as the OSS was beginning, Rose Wilder Lane wrote a book, "The Discovery of Freedom," which came as close as any book ever written to
expressing an American ideology. Although the Soviets have stolen the issue of liberation from us for a generation, the moral and intellectual inconsistency of their position has led increasing numbers of freedom loving people across the world to take up arms against them and their puppet regimes. Rose Wilder Lane's concluding remarks show us the direction we need to take:

"Americans know that all men are free. All over the world there are men who know it now. The pygmy Republic has become a colossus and too little and too late, the Old World tyrants attack this Revolution with its own tools.

Win this war? Of course Americans will win this war. This is only a war; there is more than that.

Five generations of Americans have led the Revolution and the time is coming when Americans will set the whole world free."

Recommended Republican Platform Plank

A Republican administration will continue its efforts to override bureaucratic resistance to the development of an American capability to support guerrilla movements.
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

Afghanistan is the birthplace of Zoroaster, founder of the first monotheistic religion, Zoroastrianism, which was based on the universal struggle of good against evil.

Alexander the Great could not conquer Afghanistan militarily, so he approached the situation from a new angle and married an Afghan, Roxanne of Kunar, and Afghanistan united with the Hellenic Empire in 331 B.C.

The last person to conquer Afghanistan was Chinghiz Khan in the thirteenth century. He used battalions of 1000 men called Hazaras to subdue the area; today, his descendants, who occupy the central region of Afghanistan and are highly respected for their courage, military astuteness and success in resisting the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, share the same name.

Great speculation exists on the origin of Afghanistan's people. According to some people, the inhabitants of Nuristan are descendants of the Aryan race. After WWII, several German officers on the run settled in Afghanistan because of their resemblance to those Afghans with light hair and blue eyes. Ironically, some members of the Pashtu tribe claim to be related to one of the ten lost tribes of Israel.

The first expression of Russian interest in Afghanistan backfired in 1836 when a travelling British archeologist, E. Humboldt, hoodwinked the Russian military commander of Central Asia into sending a Lithuanian revolutionary anarchist, Jonas Vitkevicius, to Kabul as the Russian agent of influence. Information sent back to the general was, of course, faulty and benefited the British who also had plans for Afghanistan.

In the eighteenth century, Afghanistan became a scene of confrontation as Russia expanded southwards and Great Britain moved to the north from India. Although the British controlled Afghanistan's kings and outmaneuvered the Russians in the region throughout the nineteenth century, they never succeeded in subduing the people who gained their full independence in 1919 with the signing of the Anglo-Afghan Treaty.

Afghan leaders went to great lengths to ensure the security of their nation. In 1921, an Afghan-Soviet treaty of friendship was signed. This was followed by a treaty of non-aggression in 1928, and in 1931 by the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Neutrality and Mutual Non-Aggression. Under the reign of King Zahir Shah, who ascended to the throne in 1933, and with the protection of these treaties, Afghanistan developed a mutual economic relationship with the Soviet Union over the next forty years based on Afghanistan's need to develop and the Soviet Union's need for raw materials.

A nationalist president, Mohammad Daoud, who took over in a bloodless coup in 1973, eventually decreased the Soviet presence in Afghanistan because of fears over the increasing role that the Soviets were playing in Afghan domestic politics. This led to the communist takeover on April 27, 1978, in which Daoud, his family and advisors were executed, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979.
OVERVIEW

SIZE: Afghanistan covers the same area as Texas.

TERRAIN: There are three major regions. The Central Highlands belong to the Himalayan mountain range and are known as the Hindu Kush. With peaks above 21,000 feet, the range descends from China and Pakistan towards Iran and covers two-thirds of the country. The Northern Plains above the Hindu Kush are fertile while the Southern Plateau is arid. Using their limited land wisely, Afghan farmers have enabled Afghanistan to be one of the few Third World nations that have never experienced famine at least not until the Soviet invasion occurred.

CLIMATE: Cold winters and dry summers mark the varied geography of Afghanistan. The northeastern mountainous regions are extremely cold in the winter, the central area of Afghanistan is seasonal with a rainy period and the south is generally hot and dry.

POPULATION: 16 to 19 million.

ETHNIC COMPOSITION: 75% of the people are sedentary, the others are nomadic. The two largest tribal groups are the Pashtuns and the Tadjiks. Other significant groups include the Uzbeks, Turkomans and Hazaras. Afghans are renowned for their strict code of honor which entails defending friends and guests to the death, protecting their families and adhering to their religious principles honestly and devoutly.

RELIGION: Predominantly Islam, 80% are Sunnis and 19% are Shiites. Islam was brought to Afghanistan in the seventh century by Arab invaders and displaced Zoroastrianism, Buddhism and Hinduism by the ninth century.

LANGUAGES: Dari (Afghan Farsi or Persian) and Pashto (language of the Pashtuns) are the official tongues of Afghanistan although more than twenty others are spoken.
BOARD MEMBERS


Donald Weidenwebber: Founder and President of Computer Concepts in Portland, Oregon, a firm that also serves as distributor for several major computer companies in American Northwest. Shortly after invasion, founded American Aid for Afghans (AAA) which has supported French medical teams and Radio Free Kabul guerrilla radio network inside Afghanistan. Six weeks before Soviet offensive in Panjshir valley this spring, personally delivered 248,000 worth of combat support supplies to Afghan resistance. For four years, AAA has run the most effective private-source effort to aid Afghan Resistance.

Thomas Coutiere: Director of Afghan Studies Center at University of Nebraska at Omaha. Peace Corps veteran of Afghanistan. Organized and conducted State Department conference on Afghanistan in 1983, and has organized and testified in more Congressional hearings on Afghanistan than any other individual.

Sayed Jemal Houssein: First generation Afghan-American and self-made oil entrepreneur from New York City. Concern about genocide in Afghanistan led him to sell much of Shah Oil Company to fight for the survival of the country of his father. President of Anthropology Museum in New York City for three years. Recipient of Margaret Mead award for outstanding contributions to the field of anthropology. Commander of American Legion Post 1850 for three years, and deputy director of Governor Mario Cuomo's transition team.
Officers

Andrew Linas Eiva: Born in refugee camp in Bonn. Parents fled communism and escaped from Lithuania to U.S. in 1949. Grandson of Kazimieras Ladyga, youngest general in Lithuanian history, who drove Bolsheviks out of Lithuania in 1918 and became armed forces chief of staff of independent Lithuania. Graduated from West Point in 1972 where he was a champion boxer. Served with distinction in U.S. Army both as Green Beret and an airborne ranger. Recognized guerilla warfare expert. Left army in 1980 to work with Afghan freedom fighters and has accompanied them in Afghanistan four times.

From One Kind of Army to Another

BY LESLIE H. GELB

WASHINGTON, May 21 — Andrew Elva did not want the Mujahadeen guerrillas fighting the Russians in Afghanistan to suffer the same fate as the friends and relatives of his parents in Lithuania after World War II. To him, this meant only enough American covert support for “freedom fighters” to satisfy American political concerns, only enough for the liberation movement to die slowly, and in the end, not even that.

So, three years ago, he gave up his West Point commission in the United States Army and went off to secret sites in Afghanistan and elsewhere to train Afghan guerrillas. He was jailed by the Pakistanis for meddling, and is under investigation by the Department of Justice for possible violation of the Neutrality Act.

In the meantime, he wrote a Senate resolution introduced by Senator Paul Tsongas, Democrat of Massachusetts, calling for more aid to the Afghan rebels, and talked a conservative lobbying group into financing its own lobbying operation. The resolution has been cosponsored by 59 Senators, all except Charles McC. Mathias Jr., and was derailed on the ground that it promised more than the United States would deliver and would lead only to dashed hopes for the Afghans.

Says Pakistan Diverts Arms

Mr. Elva’s message is a simple one. Even though he says he knows President Reagan has ordered an increase in the quantity and quality of the ostensibly covert military aid to the guerrillas, he has been out in the field with them and does not see the results.

“What I saw was antitank mines with cut fuses, demolition equipment with parts that don’t match, mortars of poor accuracy and range, rounds that are mostly duds, and shoulder-fired antiaircraft missiles that aren’t effective.”

He also contends that the Government of Pakistan is diverting a good deal of the best equipment and arms for itself, a point one Administration intelligence official says is true.

Last week Mr. Elva opened a one-room office in Alexandria, Va., for the organization he called American-Afghan Action, although there is no sign on the door. With this move, he entered the small and often tempestuous world of organizations and individuals pressing Congress “to help the Afghans regain their freedom.” As Mr. Elva put it, “and not to let them down the way we did all the liberation movements before them.”

He counts the score of American support for liberation movements since World War II “as 0 to 12, with Afghanistan as lucky 13.” The other ventures supported and then dropped by Washington he lists as Lithuania, Albania, the Ukraine, Poland, Tibet, China, Cuba, Kurdistan, Angola, the Hmong tribe in Laos and Surinam.

Grandfather Served Lithuania

The one that fires his imagination most is Lithuania. His grandfather, Gen. Kazimieras Ladyga, fought the Russian revolutionaries at the end of World War I, and was chief of staff of the armed forces of independent Lithuania from 1925 to 1927. “He left the service because he and my grandmother were prominent social democrats and opposed the slide toward dictatorship in Lithuania.”

Their main objective, he said, was “to help the Lithuanian independence.” Something that was lost when Soviet troops occupied that country in 1940. General Ladyga was arrested, sent to Siberia, tortured and died, according to Mr. Elva.

Mr. Elva was born in a refugee camp in Bonn on Oct. 26, 1948, reared on stories about Lithuanian resistance, American support for a while and finally, abandonment.

“After the Russian invasion of Afghanistan in December, 1979, I saw the United States was not performing to help the Afghans,” he said. “I wanted to do something about it, but didn’t know how to face my wife, tell her she’d have to give up the comfortable life as wife to an Army captain. She sensed what I was thinking and said, ‘Andy, you’ve been dreaming about this your whole life, why don’t you get off your duff and do it.’”

Since then, he has worked at odd jobs such as driving a taxi and teaching German to American soldiers to finance his five trips to Afghanistan and Pakistan. He says he trained Afghan guerrillas in bases in West Germany and the United States, and has accompanied the Mujahadeen in the field “but not engaging in operations.” He says he has worked on a program to encourage Soviet soldiers to defect. The Russian soldiers have to Canada and Sweden to defect to, so the goal was to develop one, to train the Afghans to do this.”

Administration officials who know of Mr. Elva’s activities confirmed his accounts of his actions.

His thoughts last year turned increasingly to Washington where, he felt, the fate of the Mujahadeen could be largely determined. According to several Congressional aides, Mr. Elva came to them with the idea of a resolution. One conservative aide told Mr. Elva that if he could entice a liberal Democrat to introduce the bill, Mr. Elva said, he could promise 35 conservatives who would sign on as well.

He Works Tirelessly

Senator Tsongas agreed to be the main sponsor of a resolution stating in part that “it would be indefensible to provide the freedom fighters with only enough aid to fight and die but not enough to advance their cause of freedom,” to “provide material assistance as the U.S. considers appropriate,” and to “pursue a negotiated settlement of the war.”

Christopher Cabrera, legislative aide to Mr. Tsongas, said of Mr. Elva, “He works tirelessly and passionately, but calmly and rationally and wants to see results.”

Paul Weis, head of the conservative lobbying group Coalition for America, thought enough of the enterprise to give Mr. Elva $2,000 to open his office, with a commitment of another $1,000.

Some of the other pro-Afghan groups were not happy about the newcomer, according to Mr. Elva and Congressional aides. “One person told me, ‘How dare you do this, you’re a nobody,’” Mr. Elva said.

Mr. Elva’s public resolution calling, in effect, for more covert aid to the Afghan guerrillas came up for a vote at the very end of last year and, because of Senate procedure, required unanimous consent to pass. Mr. Mathias blocked it. Mr. Elva is at work on a new one.
$50 Million for Covert Arms

More Aid Voted for Afghan Rebels

By Margaret Shapiro
Washington Post Staff Writer

The House Appropriations Committee has approved $50 million in new covert assistance this year to the rebels fighting the Soviet-backed government in Afghanistan, congressional sources said yesterday.

The action, if left intact by the House and the Senate, would raise the total covert funding for the Afghan rebels this year to about $85 million, according to a source familiar with the classified appropriation.

The money was added in a closed session to a $5.4 billion supplemental appropriation for this fiscal year that the Appropriations Committee approved Thursday.

The Reagan administration requested the supplemental assistance to offset rebel losses of equipment during recent Soviet assaults on rebel-held areas in the Panjshir Valley north of the Afghan capital of Kabul.

The covert funding has been under way since shortly after the Dec. 27, 1979, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, sources said. They added that it probably is the largest covert CIA operation, followed by funding of the “contra” rebels fighting the leftist Sandinista government of Nicaragua.

Estimates about the amount of annual covert assistance vary, but one intelligence source familiar with the program said that Congress has approved about $30 million to $35 million each year. The money is used for arms and munitions sent to the rebels through Pakistan, sources said.

The money provided generally reflects the administration’s request for the covert program, sources said.

The intelligence authorization bill for fiscal year 1985 that was approved by the House Intelligence Committee and is expected to go to the floor for debate next week includes about $45 million for the Afghan rebels, sources said.

Unlike the CIA’s involvement in Nicaragua, the CIA-backed effort in Afghanistan has wide bipartisan support in Congress.

But, according to sources, the administration and the House and Senate Intelligence committees have been somewhat hesitant in the past to dramatically increase amount of arms and munitions for the rebels because there have been a few instances where the weapons have been used in fighting among the various rebel groups.

Reports have circulated repeatedly that the United States was aiding the Afghanistan rebels, but the extent of the aid has remained secret. The Wall Street Journal reported the $50 million figure yesterday.

Committee sources said the covert money was added to the supplemental appropriation bill to offset the losses incurred by the rebels and to improve the quality of arms and munitions they are sent.

Afghan groups in this country supporting the rebels have said the quality of weapons sent the rebels is poor.
House Panel Votes to Give Afghan Rebels
$50 Million in Covert Help, Sources Say

By David Rogers

Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal

WASHINGTON — The House Appropriations Committee approved a $5.4 billion supplemental spending bill after secretly attaching $50 million for covert aid to Afghan rebels, intelligence sources said.

The money was appropriated to an Air Force account, but is intended to be available to the Central Intelligence Agency as part of a classified operation in which the U.S. and at least one other nation are aiding insurgents who have been fighting the Soviet-controlled government, according to the sources.

The action came as the Democratic-controlled panel rejected all of a nearly $97 million request by the Reagan administration for increased military aid to El Salvador, and approved only $230.5 million of a total foreign aid request of $943.8 million.

As a result, the total bill is significantly below the president's total supplemental request of $8.3 billion for the fiscal year ending Sept. 30, but the measure still could face a challenge on the floor because waivers are needed from the current budget ceilings for this fiscal year.

The bulk of the funds approved for foreign aid will go to the Agency for International Development, with Central American nations being the major recipients. El Salvador would receive $25 million, Costa Rica $60 million, Honduras $20 million and the Dominican Republic $40 million.

Separately, the committee approved 1985 spending totals of $93.5 billion for the departments of Labor, Education, and Health and Human Services — more than $3.7 billion above Mr. Reagan's request. The largest single increases would be in student aid; the appropriation for Pell Grants for low-income college students alone is $953 million above the administration's budget.

In contrast with the CIA's controversial involvement in Nicaragua, the Afghan rebels are a popular cause in Congress, and the House Intelligence Committee supported yesterday's decision to add the extra funds. Sources said the money is largely intended to offset losses incurred by the guerrillas during Soviet offensives this year, and while the sum involved doesn't represent a dramatic increase, there is pressure to improve the insurgents' arms.

El Salvador, like Nicaragua, remains a sore point, and while the administration may be able to restore some economic aid to Central America on the House floor, it never expected to prevail yesterday. By pressing the issue, Republicans lay the groundwork for a floor fight, but the president's strategy must ultimately depend on the Republican-controlled Senate and its Appropriations Committee, which takes up the issue next week.

Though Central America is the focus of the foreign aid debate, the cuts made by the committee include $323 million in Mr. Reagan's request for such multinational lending institutions as the World Bank, and the House seems content to force the Senate to take the lead here as well.

The remaining items in the supplemental bill are largely non-controversial and include $2 billion in pay increases for federal military and civilian employees, and $700 million for the food stamp program. While cutting foreign aid, the committee added $350 million for food assistance, and $60 million for emergency food and shelter programs. A potentially controversial request for $11 million for work on congressional library buildings was eliminated, but the