

NARCOTICS INTERDICTION

IN AFGHANISTAN AND CENTRAL ASIA

CHALLENGES FOR INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE

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A report to the
OPEN SOCIETY INSTITUTE

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A Report to the Open Society Institute's
Central Eurasia Project and Network Women's Program

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Foreword

Under the Taliban, Afghanistan became the world's leading exporter of heroin, in part by exploiting new trafficking routes through Central Asia. The international community's response to this problem was limited throughout the 1990s. Only a few international agencies attempted to counter the growing drug trade by introducing drug interdiction programs. While humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan's impoverished and war-ravaged population was constantly threatened by Taliban policies, the United Nations and the U.S. government attempted to sustain the effort to curb the heroin trade. Some specialists assert that this effort contributed to what they consider one of the most dramatic achievements in the global war on drugs in recent memory—the Taliban's enforcement of a ban on all opium poppy production in early 2001. Others insist that the role of the UN and the United States in securing the ban was minimal, and that the significance of the ban itself has been overstated.

In the United States, following the U.S.-led military action beginning in October 2001, the “war on drugs” in Afghanistan has become part of the “war on terrorism.” In the past, counternarcotics efforts by UN and U.S. government agencies grew out of concerns about the overwhelming social ills associated with drug trafficking out of Afghanistan, such as increased drug addiction, drug overdosing, and criminality. Now, however, the agencies must escalate their counternarcotics efforts for an even more urgent reason: to reduce the revenues from drug trafficking that allegedly fund international terrorism.

As the war against the Taliban and al Qaeda draws to an apparent close in Afghanistan, there has never been greater consensus in the international community about the need to help Afghanistan stabilize, rebuild, and develop. To keep pace with its escalating involvement in the region, the international community has had to rapidly deepen its understanding of the area's problems and challenges. As these concerns become paramount and aid increases dramatically, much care should be given to designing new drug programs.

The Central Eurasia Project and the Network Women's Program of the Open Society Institute hope that this report will offer a useful guide to international policy-makers and donors in Afghanistan and neighboring Central Asian states at this crucial juncture. The report, commissioned by the two OSI programs to help inform debate about counternarcotics efforts in the region, serves three main purposes.

First, it summarizes the efforts of the United Nations, principally the UN Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UN ODCCP) and the United States govern-

ment—the world’s leading proponents of counternarcotics programs in Central Asia and Afghanistan. It identifies their goals, programs, and, where possible, budgetary commitments, and raises serious questions that allow the reader to evaluate achievements to date regarding interdiction itself and the assistance context in which the “war on drugs” is being fought.

Second, the report identifies and provides field-based information about the societal problems that have both led to and been exacerbated by drug trafficking in the region. These concerns include deep-seated corruption; discrimination against women, such as invasive body searches at border crossings; and a range of other human rights abuses, especially violations of the right to due process. The latter are so rampant that it is the rule rather than the exception that border guards and police officials, in order to extort bribes, will beat, arbitrarily detain, intimidate, rob, and sometimes illegally arrest individuals crossing from Afghanistan and across Central Asian borders. The widespread corruption and arbitrary treatment of people throughout these societies, fed by drug trafficking, have themselves become a direct source of destabilization in the region.

Finally, the report seeks to help international donors incorporate into their assistance programs a series of recommendations for addressing interdiction more effectively and for mitigating these catastrophic social ills. Principal recommendations include designing programs to fit relatively corrupt and authoritarian societies, incorporating more effective oversight and evaluation, and promoting human rights protections in the implementation of counternarcotics programs.

This report is meant to complement other work that OSI has conducted on counternarcotics efforts in general and on both interdiction and demand reduction policies throughout the world. Western policy has traditionally held that the increased incarceration of “suppliers” is appropriate by definition and that reduction in the supply of drugs “upstream” is a greater priority than reducing the demand for drugs in neighboring Central Asian countries and in Europe.

The Open Society Institute and a number of leading drug policy institutions, however, have observed that supply side efforts everywhere in the world fail if they are not accompanied by substantial efforts to reduce demand for narcotics. Moreover, demand reduction initiatives are in and of themselves a direct way of mitigating devastating social problems, such as the spread of HIV/AIDS, drug overdosing, and disproportionate or illegal incarceration.

Governmental and international assistance programs addressing this concern have met with measurable success in some parts of the world. However, some governments of Central Asia, like those throughout the former Soviet Union, continue to prohibit or impede these efforts.

Pragmatic and humane responses to drug use, such as needle exchange pro-

grams, which have proven successful in reducing the spread of HIV/AIDS, are dramatically underused as a weapon in the harm reduction arsenal in Central Asia, now in the beginning stages of an HIV/AIDS explosion. Efforts by OSI's International Harm Reduction Development Program and some fellow donors to introduce needle exchanges, methadone maintenance programs, and other demand reduction and harm reduction programs in Central Asia as well as Eastern Europe are proving extremely promising. Additional support for such efforts is urgently needed.

OSI works to promote awareness of the societal consequences of drug trafficking and use, and of counternarcotics programs on the policy level. As part of its Eurasia Policy Forum in Washington, D.C., the Central Eurasia Project in 2001 conducted a series of three expert panels on drug trafficking in Central Asia. The first two addressed questions of demand in Central Asia and the impact of drug trafficking on a range of social problems in Tajikistan. Author Nancy Lubin presented a preliminary version of this report on international interdiction efforts at the Eurasia Policy Forum of June 13, 2001. (All papers from the forum are available on the Central Eurasia Project's website Eurasianet at <http://www.eurasianet.org>.)

Global experience has shown that addressing social grievances through the protection of basic human rights and support for social and economic development is highly effective not only in reducing drug use but also in mitigating extremism and promoting constructive social and political processes. In short, promotion of civil society is one of the most effective, cost-efficient, and far-sighted ways of fighting terrorism.

Regional and international efforts to stem drug trafficking in Afghanistan and Central Asia are urgently needed. But the future of these efforts is uncertain due to the ongoing military activities in the region, the need for long-term reconstruction assistance, and shifting political alliances.

Assistance to Central Asia and Afghanistan requires careful, responsible conceptualization and implementation to provide for accurate evaluation of the impact on drug trafficking and for the greatest possible degree of protection for a country's social fabric. The Open Society Institute hopes that this report will be a useful tool in generating and sustaining informed debate about the nature of international assistance.

Anthony Richter
Director
Central Eurasia Project
January 2002

Have counternarcotics programs helped abate drug trafficking throughout the region? Have they alleviated the human rights, ethnic, religious, and other societal problems associated with the growing drug trade? Or have they made matters worse?

Introduction

In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the issue of narcotics trafficking in Afghanistan and Central Asia has moved to center stage. What was previously viewed as a secondary issue, remote from U.S. borders and from U.S. national security interests, has suddenly become a key element of U.S. policy because of the linkage between drug trafficking and the funding of terrorist organizations based in this region.

To be sure, the growing magnitude of narcotics cultivation in Afghanistan and trafficking throughout Central Asia in the 1990s had spawned a wide range of policies and programs on the part of Western governments and international donors. In the last decade, tens of millions of dollars were allocated to provide training and equipment, and to support institutional development and other efforts deemed critical to addressing the problem of narcotics cultivation and trafficking.

But it is now clear that these programs have been limited in scope and design, and far more is needed to stem the flow of this trade. The United States and its allies, having given short shrift to the narcotics problem and other related issues in the region, now face the consequences of their policy of neglect.

Today, policymakers and donors are calling for increased funding for more counternarcotics programs in the region, in large part due to the heightened interest in

counterterrorism. But before endorsing more funding for more of the same programs, decision-makers would do well to assess the record of these myriad Western programs over the past decade.

What has been the impact of these programs to date? Have they helped significantly to abate the drug flow throughout Afghanistan and Central Asia, or have they further complicated the problem? Have they alleviated the human rights, ethnic, religious, and other societal problems associated with the growing drug trade—and now viewed as catalysts for conflict and terrorism in their own right—or perhaps inadvertently made matters worse? What kinds of questions do the programs raise regarding successes and failures, and how we go about conceptualizing future policies and challenges?

While these questions elude definitive answers, a fair, critical, and sober discussion of current antidrug efforts in the region is important if future programs and policies are to be shaped more effectively and productively.

The purpose of this brief “think piece” is to serve as a catalyst for just such a discussion. After a brief background to the drug trafficking problem in this region, the paper focuses on:

- ▶ Counternarcotics trafficking programs of the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UN ODCCP) and U.S. government bilateral efforts;
- ▶ the impact of these policies and programs on the level of trafficking itself;
- ▶ the impact of these programs on gender, ethnic, and religious issues, and questions of civil society; and
- ▶ recommendations for policymakers, donors, and practitioners on the ground.

The analysis suggests the need for a serious evaluation of counternarcotics efforts in Afghanistan and Central Asia, including a reassessment of how these efforts fit into overall U.S. policy in this part of the world, an evaluation of their broader political and social impact, and a reassessment of the balance between interdiction efforts and demand reduction programs.¹ Counternarcotics programs should be made a high priority in this part of the world. But they will be counterproductive if conducted without considering questions of broader economic and social development. And they may well backfire if applied unevenly: drug trafficking should not be tolerated among the West’s allies while condemned among its foes.

The analysis also suggests that greater attention must be paid not only to what programs are conducted, but also to how programs are designed, implemented, monitored, and evaluated on the ground. This approach includes greater coordination with

other donor programs that address issues of rule of law, women and families, human rights, and some of the social and economic problems that cause drug trafficking in the first place. It also includes closer examination of how counternarcotics programs affect crosscutting issues such as corruption and the protection of human rights, which should be made explicit and higher priorities in international counternarcotics assistance. Without a serious rethinking of strategies and tactics, international programs could well exacerbate a wide range of societal ills in these countries—and a range of threats to the West—rather than helping to ameliorate them.

In Central Asia, increasing numbers of impoverished people are willing to risk the harsh penalties imposed for drug trafficking—including the death penalty—for the chance to receive substantial financial rewards.

Background

Narcotics cultivation and trafficking has a long history in Central Asia and Afghanistan, but it has expanded dramatically over the past decade as a result of the wars in Afghanistan and Tajikistan, the collapse of the USSR, and the subsequent political unrest, economic strains, and social upheavals. The year 1999 saw an explosion of opium cultivation, with an estimated doubling of opium production from 1998. By 2000, UN ODCCP estimated that 75 percent of the world's heroin supply was now originating from opium cultivated in Afghanistan and smuggled through mountainous terrain that is particularly difficult to patrol under even the best of circumstances.

In early 2001, international narcotics officials were surprised that the Taliban regime appeared to have started enforcing its long-stated, but long-ignored ban on opium production. But events later in the year made the ban short lived, and it is expected that narcotics trafficking will remain high. During the war in Afghanistan, farmers even in Taliban-controlled areas began planting opium poppies. And reports suggested that cultivation remained high in Northern Alliance-held territories as well. Because of large stockpiles from past years' bumper harvests, Afghanistan continues to dominate the world market for opium.

A growing proportion of Afghanistan's opium is trafficked through Central Asia. Until recently, most of the drugs grown in Afghanistan reached Western consumers through Pakistan and Iran, but a clampdown on drug trafficking in Iran, as well as the increasingly porous borders of Central Asia, shifted that balance. Today, as much as half of all narcotics produced in Afghanistan may pass through the Central Asian states of Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan on its way to European and Russian markets, and sometimes to the United States and Canada. As much as 80 percent of the heroin seized in Europe and 95 percent of the heroin seized in Great Britain is estimated to originate from poppies in Afghanistan—with the majority of that transported through Central Asia.²

As in other parts of the world, narcotics trafficking is big business in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Some experts have estimated that in 2000 the opium cultivated in Afghanistan, sold in the form of heroin at retail prices, was worth roughly \$100 billion. In Afghanistan, the price for a kilogram of opium was about \$30 in 2000. In Moscow, a kilogram of heroin (made from ten kilograms of opium) cost up to \$30,000. In Western Europe, the kilogram of heroin, sold at the retail level in gram units or smaller, was worth as much as \$150,000. Kyrgyz Deputy Prime Minister of National Security Miroslav Niyazov estimated that international crime syndicates annually receive \$1 billion on narcotics trafficked through Kyrgyzstan alone.³

While trafficking is big business for some, it is considered a way of life—and sometimes a matter of survival—for many others in the region. Although less than 1 percent of the drug proceeds remains in Afghanistan, opium poppy cultivation has become an integral part of the country's rural economy. Many farmers are heavily dependent on the profits they derive from growing the illicit crop to make ends meet. For some, advances paid for their opium crop reportedly have provided their only access to credit and, sometimes, their only source of survival during the winter months. Indeed, the Western press reported that Afghan farmers “cursed” the government's ban on poppy growing, in the words of one Afghan, “because they felt they had lost a means to livelihood.”⁴ In Central Asia, increasing numbers of impoverished people are willing to risk the harsh penalties imposed for drug trafficking—including the death penalty—for the chance to receive substantial financial rewards. As the former Kyrgyz chairman of the Commission on Drug Control admitted in 1997, “In some regions, the only way to survive is to take part in the drug trade.”⁵

These realities have kept the drug trade vibrant particularly in Afghanistan. With the Taliban in control of about 90 percent of Afghan territory and a similar percentage of the country's total opium and heroin output, opium markets and heroin production facilities flourished in full view of government authorities until 2001. In spite of repeated assurances to the international community that it would eliminate opium cultivation, the

Taliban government in fact remained complicit in the growth and trade of opium and heroin. It reportedly imposed, as on other goods, a 10 to 20 percent tax on the proceeds derived from the sale of opium. Estimates of revenues provided to the Taliban each year by taxing narcotics production and trafficking ranged from \$30 million⁶ to as high as \$75 million, enabling the government to finance ongoing wars against opposition forces as well as, reportedly, terrorist activities. Indeed, some Western and local observers believe that incursions of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) into and within Central Asia in 1999 and 2000 were launched not only for the stated purpose of founding an Islamic state, but also to distract security forces and open new drug routes.⁷ The various groups in the Northern Alliance, for their part, likewise relied on drug trafficking as a key component of their financing.

The Taliban's sudden decision in 2001 to enforce its ban on opium poppy cultivation led to an almost total eradication of the annual poppy crop in Afghanistan. According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), production dropped from 3,656 metric tons in the year 2000 to 74 metric tons in 2001.⁸ But U.S. and foreign experts question whether the drop in production was due to a commitment on the part of the Taliban to eradicate the drug trade or to other factors. Most now believe that the reversal in policy was a calculated business decision to use up existing stockpiles and drive up the price of heroin while gaining political points with the international community in the process. The DEA noted an initial steep rise in the price of heroin in the region (which would be consistent with the crackdown on production), and trafficking rates remained high. Since the onset of war, however, opium and heroin have reportedly flooded out of Afghanistan into Pakistan, and prices have plummeted, in some cases to one-half to one-third of their pre-September 11 levels.⁹ At the same time, opium production, and its manufacturing into heroin, reportedly continued unabated in the territory under the Northern Alliance during the Taliban-imposed ban in the rest of Afghanistan. Today, with the future of Afghanistan in question, drug trafficking is likely to remain a key source of financing conflict and a critical way to make ends meet in the midst of growing poverty and devastation.

The combination of vast economic gains and growing poverty among the population as a whole have kept drug trafficking high in Central Asia as well. While the amount of drugs seized by Central Asian border guards has increased each year, it has not been nearly sufficient to offset the rise in production and probable trans-shipment.¹⁰ Central Asian officials blame their countries' weak interdiction records on the difficult border terrain that makes guarding against smuggling almost impossible. They also point to the lack of funding for border guard training and specialized equipment to stop well-financed narcotics smuggling rings. Western observers believe that these constraints are only part of the picture, and that, as discussed below, a major cause is also the endemic corruption among government officials and others charged with fighting the drug trade.

Since September 11, U.S. interest in drug trafficking in the region has grown enormously, fueled by signs of large drug profits financing terrorist activities.

UN and U.S. Counternarcotics Programs

Regional and Western governments and donors have initiated a wide array of counternarcotics programs to stem the production and trafficking of drugs in Central Asia and Afghanistan. The primary sponsor of international counternarcotics programs in this part of the world is the United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention. ODCCP's projects in the region focus on reduction in opium poppy cultivation and heroin production in Afghanistan, on interdiction in Central Asia, and, recently, on education and development programs in both regions.

ODCCP's Poppy Reduction/Alternative Development Program has sought to reduce the cultivation of opium through sustainable rural development activities since 1989 and through the subsequent UN Drug Control and Rural Rehabilitation Program for Afghanistan. ODCCP programs also attempt to document the extent of illicit opium poppy cultivation in Afghanistan through an annual survey, map the cultivation of cannabis and other illicit crops in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan, and develop a system for generating, storing, and disseminating drug control data. Through funding provided by the United States, Great Britain, and, to a lesser extent, Israel and Germany, ODCCP supports an experimental biochemical research program at Uzbekistan's Institute of Genetics in Tashkent to create a fungus to destroy the opium poppy. Still other

ODCCP programs aim to reduce drug production in Afghanistan by, for example, blocking the transfer to Afghanistan of chemical precursors for heroin production.

In Central Asia, ODCCP's focus has been to assist each country in developing a centralized counternarcotics infrastructure. Efforts include strengthening indigenous counternarcotics agencies, drafting strong counternarcotics legislation (such as the laws on money laundering, asset seizure, and financial crimes that ODCCP reportedly helped to craft in Kazakhstan), providing equipment to counternarcotics forces, and, recently, establishing special courts for prosecuting crimes associated with narcotics consumption or trafficking. ODCCP has supported the establishment of national drug control administrative structures in each of the Central Asian states and sent advisors to help governments set up interministerial coordination bodies to centralize counternarcotics policies and administration. ODCCP also provides training and equipment to border guards, customs officials, and others working on counternarcotics initiatives. It helps improve forensic capacities; create policies for the storage, analysis, and destruction of narcotic and psychotropic substances; promote the effective use of drug-sniffing dogs; and strengthen drug control in railway stations and airports.

A major thrust of ODCCP programs is to support regional collaboration in all of these areas. For example, a 2000 agreement on regional cooperation in fighting transnational crime includes a protocol on counternarcotics calling for regular contact among the signatories and the establishment, with ODCCP financing, of an information and analysis clearinghouse in Tashkent. Currently, according to ODCCP, the regional office, in close coordination with headquarters, has developed a regional program that "embraces drug control, criminal justice, research and analysis, demand reduction, and prevention activities." In the spring of 2001, however, ODCCP personnel stated that the details of the regional program could not be shared.¹¹

ODCCP projects in the region are funded primarily by European countries and the United States. Since the early 1990s, the amount of money pledged to projects has risen dramatically. ODCCP's first project, in 1994, was a \$550,000 institution-building project in Kyrgyzstan. In 1999, ODCCP concluded an \$11 million project to establish a specialized drug control agency in Tajikistan. But ODCCP programs are dependent on continuously raising money from donor countries, so that several planned projects have not received the financial support originally pledged. This has disrupted programs and prompted Central Asian leaders to complain about the shortfall in expected financing.

Indeed, it has proven difficult to determine the extent to which ODCCP projects have actually been funded, what was actually implemented on the ground, how much money was actually spent, and what ODCCP thinks the programs actually achieved. According to ODCCP, budget information and program assessments are made available only to member governments. While ODCCP continues to issue useful assessments about the region's problems, details of its own programs have become more difficult to obtain.

Prior to January 2001, for example, ODCCP's website included prospective budgets for Central Asian projects. As of early 2001, ODCCP's website no longer included program budget figures, and details of project implementation have been generally unavailable.

U.S. Bilateral Programs

U.S. involvement in counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan has been limited over the past two decades for a number of reasons. In the 1980s, drugs were reportedly an important source of revenue for U.S.-supported mujahedeen, and then, in the 1990s, the United States chose not to deal with the Taliban government and did not regard drug trafficking from this region as a direct threat to U.S. interests.¹² The United States tried small crop substitution projects in the mid- to late 1990s that were widely viewed by those involved as ineffective. U.S. involvement in counternarcotics trafficking in Central Asia, though not a high priority in the 1990s, nonetheless has grown over the past few years. U.S. bilateral programs with Central Asia have overlapped those of ODCCP, focusing on the training of law enforcement personnel, working with national legislatures to draft and pass laws in compliance with UN standards on drug enforcement, and providing equipment to law enforcement officials to arrest and incarcerate narcotics traffickers.

The primary mechanism for funding U.S. bilateral counternarcotics activities is the Department of State's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL). In the case of Central Asia, INL funds 14 government agencies that provide training programs and equipment to border guards, police, judges, public prosecutors, and military officials. The agencies include the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the U.S. Customs Service, the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), and other departments and agencies (see Appendix One). Some U.S. assistance goes to Central Asian law enforcement through programs addressing issues of counterproliferation and counterterrorism administered directly through the Department of Defense (DOD) and some of these other agencies.¹³

INL-funded training has focused on providing equipment and training to assist law enforcement in drug interdiction and on providing technical assistance to allow prosecutors to more efficiently convict traffickers. According to State Department reports, from 1998 to 2000, INL-sponsored projects trained approximately 500 Central Asian law enforcement and judicial officials per year, both in-country and out-of-country.

While INL funding for Central Asia has decreased over the past two years, the Central Asia Security Initiative (CASI) was launched in 2000 to provide Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan with \$3 million each in the form of low-grade equipment for border officials and the training to use that equipment. Some government officials believe

that CASI, which is also run by the State Department, demonstrates a preference for material aid over INL-type training programs. Proponents of the plan argue that the \$9 million will be utilized simply to augment, rather than replace, other security programs.

Finally, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and other groups and agencies operate rule of law, judicial reform, and other programs that are also meant to buttress existing efforts. It is important to note that Western programs have been relatively restricted in Tajikistan, a crucial country for these efforts. The United States has not had a full embassy presence in Tajikistan since the formal withdrawal of staff for security reasons after the bombings at U.S. embassies in Africa. Also, Tajikistan has not become a signatory to the Partnership for Peace program, making it ineligible for some program funding.

In comparison to ODCCP's projects in the region as well as to U.S.-financed counternarcotics programs throughout the world, the United States earmarks few resources for the interdiction of narcotics in Central Asia. For example, while INL had a total budget of nearly \$190 million in 2000, it received only about \$2.5 million for programs in Central Asia in that year.¹⁴

This relative lack of priority for narcotics trafficking issues in Central Asia, and the Eurasian states as a whole, stems from the fact that little of the opium and heroin produced in Afghanistan ends up in the United States.¹⁵ Many U.S. experts believe that European countries should bear the financial brunt of counternarcotics efforts in Central Asia since they are the most directly affected by the region's drug trafficking. But this attitude has changed significantly since September 11. U.S. interest has grown enormously, fueled by signs of large drug profits financing terrorist activities by the Taliban as well as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), and of the potentially destabilizing impact of drug trafficking on the region as a whole.¹⁶ Despite statements by the U.S. intelligence community to the contrary, some State Department officials also expect that U.S. interest in the region will increase as Latin American cartels serving the U.S. market expand their involvement in the Afghan heroin trade. Although there are still no INL or DEA officials based in Central Asia, the U.S. Embassy in Kazakhstan did receive a legal attache in 2000 to deal with narcotics questions and the FBI opened a two-man office there. The DEA had likewise planned to open an office in Tashkent in 2000, but as of August 2001, the process had been delayed.¹⁷

Challenges to effective counternarcotics efforts include inconsistent data, corruption, weak donor coordination, limited transparency, few resources for evaluation, and lack of regional expertise.

Impact on Narcotics Trafficking

The impact of these programs on narcotics trafficking is controversial. The UN boasts that ODCCP programs helped trigger the dramatic decrease in opium production in Afghanistan and a significant rise in the number of drug seizures in Central Asia. ODCCP suggests that its quiet diplomacy and pressure contributed significantly to the sharp reversal in the Taliban's support for opium poppy cultivation, and that its programs have led to "some startling good statistics associated with drug interdiction rates in Central Asia."¹⁸ According to Kyrgyz authorities, interdiction rates in Kyrgyzstan increased fivefold from 1995 to 2000, and Tajiks reported seizing up to 1.3 tons of heroin in the first nine months of 2000. Following the initiation of large-scale UN assistance in 1999, narcotics interdiction rates reportedly grew dramatically after one year.¹⁹

But other experts urge caution in assessing results. A visit to the traditional poppy growing regions of Afghanistan by U.S. narcotics experts in May 2001 confirmed a dramatic drop in production. They question, however, as noted above, the Taliban's motives for such a sharp reversal of policy, and whether ODCCP programs contributed directly to this decision in the first place, given the fact that for many years the Taliban refused to enforce the UN-encouraged bans.

Even before the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, these experts also questioned the sustainability of the ban on opium cultivation. Afghan farmers receive far greater income by growing and selling opium poppy rather than wheat. In the words of one DEA official, the ban was “bringing their country—or certain regions of their country—to economic ruin. . . . They are trying to replace the crop with wheat, but that is easier said than done.”²⁰ The renewed planting of opium poppy in Afghanistan in the fall of 2001 helps to demonstrate how critical drugs are to the country’s economy.

In Central Asia, the “startling good statistics associated with drug interdiction rates” noted above have also been challenged. Some conjecture that seizure rates on the Central Asian borders may have increased significantly, not as a result of more effective law enforcement or border initiatives, but as a by-product of higher trafficking rates.²¹ Critics point out that while seizures may have doubled between 1999 and 2000, so did drug production in Afghanistan, and the captured drugs continue to represent a very small percentage (an estimated 5-15 percent) of the overall amount of drugs trafficked.²² These controversies magnify other concerns regarding ODCCP programs, including “minimal investment and high overhead costs” in Afghanistan;²³ erratic funding and broken promises when donor governments change their minds; and, as ODCCP’s own director put it, more talk than action in stopping drug trafficking.²⁴ While some praise the establishment of new drug commissions and other antinarcotics agencies in Central Asia, others criticize them as lax in combating the widespread corruption (and often even exacerbating the problem) in these countries, particularly in governments and law enforcement.

While some laud ODCCP’s “sustainable crop substitution” programs, others question both the value of the substitution and its sustainability. Until the findings at the beginning of 2001, poppy substitution projects in Afghanistan were viewed as deeply flawed, with declines in some districts offset by increased production in others.²⁵ A fear now is that substituting wheat for poppies without other development support would be unsustainable in the short- and long-term, because the policy would be unable to address the increasingly desperate economic woes of farmers or to stimulate economic growth.

And while some endorse the ODCCP-supported biochemical research program that may prove effective in eradicating opium crops, others are concerned about the long-term effects on plant and animal life and potential links to biological terrorism.²⁶ This has become a particularly poignant concern as more is revealed about the terrorist networks emanating from this part of the world and the anthrax-related terrorist events in the United States. The opacity surrounding programs—however justified—makes these and other criticisms only loom larger.

Official assessments of the impacts of U.S. bilateral programs may be more modest, but are no less controversial. U.S. government reports stress the number of law enforcement officials trained both in-country and abroad in counternarcotics techniques,

the quantity of modern equipment provided to allow border guards to better interdict drugs, and the advice given to help Central Asian governments enact strong counternarcotics legislation.

But some experts question whether these overall measures are meaningful to what is happening on the ground. Quantitative indicators (such as numbers of people trained and equipment delivered) do not demonstrate how the training and equipment were actually used. Were they used to fight drug trafficking, to crack down on domestic political opposition, or to assist government officials and others to more effectively traffic drugs themselves? The emphasis on the transfer of equipment has made some U.S. officials particularly uneasy. One State Department official stated off the record that transferring night vision goggles to a repressive government is “abhorrent.” “They might be used to fight drugs,” he said, “but they’re just as likely to be used to fight the opposition.”

Challenges

Most counternarcotics programs in the region confront a number of challenges that affect the impact of their efforts on drug trafficking. These challenges include contradictory and inconsistent baseline data, corruption, weak donor coordination, limited transparency in programs, limited resources for follow-up and evaluation, and lack of regional expertise.

Contradictory official estimates of quantities of narcotics cultivated, produced, and even seized in Central Asia and Afghanistan make assessments of progress difficult. In 1999, for example, U.S. government estimates of 1,700 metric tons of opium produced in Afghanistan—subsequently revised to an estimated 2,700 metric tons—contrasted markedly with the 4,600 metric tons estimated by the UN ODCCP. ODCCP estimates suggest a further 28 percent decline in opium production in 2000 while U.S. estimates report a roughly 30 percent *increase* in production. Estimates of drug seizures in Central Asia also vary dramatically within and among local and international organizations. One Kyrgyz official, for example, claimed 1.8 tons were interdicted in 1999, and another claimed twice that total, or 3.6 tons, for the same year.²⁷

In Central Asia, another challenge is the widespread, deep-seated corruption common particularly in law enforcement that allows narcotics trafficking to flourish.²⁸ Western observers have pointed to corruption among police, border guards, customs, and other government officials as one of the most important factors sustaining the large drug flow. A recent U.S. government interagency report on heroin trafficking concluded that

“increasing heroin transit through Central Asia is contributing to endemic political and bureaucratic corruption, including in security services and law enforcement agencies, throughout the region.”²⁹ Central Asian leaders have criticized their own law enforcement officials for being deeply involved in the drug trade in one way or another.

It is important to underscore, however, that corruption in Central Asia is not a matter of corrupt individuals acting purely for personal gain, but rather it is part of a highly organized system of economic crime that permeates all aspects of life.³⁰ Yet few Western programs have had the inclination, or the capability, to sort through how this system works and how it may affect, and be affected by, Western counternarcotics efforts. As a result, some Western specialists involved in programs have expressed concern that they do not always know whether they are transferring expertise to create more highly professional law enforcement—or more sophisticated traffickers.³¹ Limited resources and regional expertise often hinder the ability of programs to assess who wins and who loses from the rampant trafficking in Central Asia—or from the Western programs introduced to combat trafficking.

All of these problems are complicated by weak mechanisms and few resources for follow-up, evaluation, and monitoring on the part of implementing agencies. INL has yet to develop a standard mechanism for reporting and evaluation. U.S. State Department and law enforcement officials also state that there have yet to be any formal evaluations of the counternarcotics programs carried out in Central Asia. State Department officials say that INL evaluations consist primarily of trip reports. The few formal evaluations have been cursory, focusing on numbers of people trained and equipment transferred. It is unclear what, if any, internal and external evaluations are conducted on ODCCP programs since none are publicly available, but anecdotal information suggests they, too, are cursory. Indeed, according to a former key official at the drug control agency, systems for project review and evaluation were abolished in 1997—a move that was strongly criticized in a June 2001 UN Inspector General report.³² The limited transparency on the part of donors and the often limited coordination among them³³ make project implementation even more difficult.

Finally, programs are handicapped by limited regional expertise. Many counternarcotics training programs are designed and implemented by law enforcement specialists with little, if any, prior experience in this part of the world. According to U.S. law enforcement specialists themselves, trainees are often selected by local foreign service nationals with little independent vetting, while instructors are provided little support to ensure that their training fits the Central Asian context.³⁴ A lack of transparency or accessibility to the programs hampers the participation of local communities that would have a better understanding of the region and its problems.

The “war on drugs” has often been used to crack down on political opposition, target religious and ethnic groups, limit civil liberties, and tighten political control— as well as to extract money.

Societal Questions: Women, Human Rights, Conflict

The broader Central Asian context itself raises perhaps the most troubling and challenging set of questions for Western counternarcotics programs. Efforts to crack down on smuggling have created a multitude of secondary injustices—regarding questions of civil society, gender, ethnic relations, and religious tolerance—that may ultimately prove most deleterious to the fabric of Central Asian society. The limited attention paid to societal questions by counternarcotics programs, as well as the limited oversight and accountability of the programs, has prompted criticism that Western programs may well be exacerbating these problems as much as they may be trying to ameliorate them.

Human Rights and Religious or Ethnic Tensions

Throughout the world, critics of counterdrug policies often point out that drug interdiction efforts frequently come at the expense of civil liberties. In Central Asia, where corruption and human rights abuses by government officials are often the norm, these dangers are only magnified. The “war on drugs” has often been used for political ends—

to crack down on political opposition, target particular religious and ethnic groups, limit civil liberties, and tighten political control—as well as for extracting greater financial gain through bribes and extortion.

In Uzbekistan, for example, where the government holds that radical Islamic groups are fronts for drug trafficking rings, law enforcement officers may plant drugs on the person or property of political opponents or religious figures and then prosecute them on trumped-up drug charges. The courts rarely challenge police accounts or forced confessions, particularly in trials with political repercussions. The crackdown on the IMU has made use of these tactics in order to increase sentences since drug trafficking carries some of the most severe penalties, including death.

Antidrug efforts are also criticized for targeting particular ethnic groups. This accusation is difficult to assess systematically. (Drug syndicates themselves are surprisingly diverse in terms of ethnicity.) But Tajiks and Afghans reportedly feel especially targeted by counternarcotics searches. Westerners and locals alike recall incidents such as the one in early 1997 when local TV repeatedly showed footage of large drug raids at the Uzbek border on the train from Dushanbe, Tajikistan, to Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Later that same day, Afghan and Pakistani illegal immigrants were rounded up indiscriminately at rail stations and airports.³⁵ Similar anecdotes are currently heard in Kazakhstan as well.

Increasingly, counternarcotics work has become lucrative business even for low-level participants. Customs officials and border guards, mostly unencumbered by Western or local oversight, frequently stop people under the pretext of looking for drugs, sometimes threaten imprisonment, and force them to pay enormous bribes and/or undergo humiliating body searches. Body searches are said to be routinely conducted without probable cause at all border points to and from Tajikistan. The practice is widely viewed as a way not only to interdict illicit drugs, but also, if not primarily, to extract large bribes.³⁶ One rice trader from Batken, who travels frequently between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, said that typically at border posts “the Uzbek police start searching us and rummaging around in our baggage. They say they are looking for drugs. . . . I know several Kyrgyz businessmen who have been relieved of their goods as well as large sums of money. Of course, they didn’t try to complain because everyone knows that if you end up in an Uzbek prison, you’ll probably never get out.”³⁷

Women and Families

All of these concerns are increasingly affecting women in Central Asia, both as traffickers and as victims of the drug war. Although consistent figures are hard to come by, all Central Asian governments have said they are worried about the growing involvement

of women in drug trafficking, particularly as couriers or so-called “camels” or “mules.” In Kyrgyzstan, for example, an estimated 30 percent of drug addicts and drug traffickers are women; in Tajikistan, the proportion of women traffickers is estimated to be higher and on the rise.³⁸

This marks a sharp change from the early 1990s. If the number of men arrested for crimes related to narcotics doubled between 1993 and 1998, the number of women arrested for the same crimes increased fourfold. If in 1993 women comprised 10 percent of those prosecuted for trafficking in Tajikistan, by 2000 their proportion had doubled, to 20 percent. Although the proportion of women involved in smuggling is still small, and their growth rate relatively modest, Tajik television and the press in particular have focused on the involvement of women in drug trafficking. Concerns in other Central Asian countries have led to the fear that, in the words of the chief of the Anti-Drug Directorate of the Kyrgyz Interior Ministry, Colonel Rasulberdy Raimberdiyev, “the drug business is being ‘feminized.’”³⁹

Without a doubt, many women who get involved in drug trafficking view it as a source of economic gain, regardless of economic status. But women, particularly rural women, are also vulnerable to the overtures of drug dealers due to rampant poverty, discrimination, and despair—as well as their ignorance of local laws. According to a local survey among women inmates in Tajikistan,⁴⁰ almost two-thirds (62.4 percent) said the main reason they became involved in trafficking was because of dire economic circumstances. In Tajikistan, women widowed by the war are reported to be particularly vulnerable, as they face the often daunting burden of being the sole providers for their children. But some husbands reportedly also push their second or third wives to become traffickers to better provide for the family; some women are “conned” by more seasoned traffickers; and some women find their children kidnapped until they agree to carry narcotics from one location to another.⁴¹

Women are recruited or forced into drug trafficking for a number of reasons. Some locals report that in certain areas of Central Asia women are sought-after couriers because, if caught carrying drugs, they are treated more leniently than men. More commonly, however, women are set up to be caught as the “cover up,” or “shirma,” allowing customs officials to look the other way and let the “big fish” continue unhampered. With corruption and collusion widespread between customs officials and drug traffickers, customs officials are sometimes informed beforehand whom to search so that the traffickers carrying large amounts of drugs can pass through without detection.

The net result is that women increasingly have become the target of law enforcement, with growing numbers of women arrested or subjected to humiliating body searches and other indignities at Central Asian borders. Women comprise only a small proportion of the estimated 2,000 prisoners in Tajik jails for drug-related crimes, yet the number of women imprisoned for trafficking has reportedly almost tripled in two years,

from 63 women in 1997 to 177 women in 1999. Many women view strip searches as so common they avoid cross-border travel whenever possible.⁴² The situation has contributed to a further destruction of the formerly strong social ties that united relatives living in different republics and now in neighboring CIS countries.

Some argue that strip searches are justified because concealment on one's person has become the most common form of drug smuggling among women. According to an Open Society Institute study of women and drugs in Tajikistan, most women traffickers, or more than 60 percent of those surveyed, tend to smuggle drugs in their bodies (either injected or hidden in their sexual organs). Another 20 percent said they carry drugs on their bodies. Only 12 percent carry drugs in a pocket book or other baggage, and only 7.2 percent use other methods.⁴³

Yet even those women who suggest there might be cause for the searches also say that the strip searches have gone too far and are more widespread than warranted. Women report that searches are normally conducted to obtain bribes rather than to find contraband. They report that the officials verbally abuse them and search their bodies in ways that gratuitously humiliate them. According to Human Rights Watch, these invasive searches are particularly traumatic for women who lived through the civil war in Tajikistan, during which sexual violence against women was widespread.⁴⁴ Despite official recognition and internal directives to address this problem in Tajikistan over the past two years, little seems to have changed.⁴⁵

People in Central Asia also worry about consequences of the drug trade on family life and traditional communities. Although no systematic studies have yet been undertaken on the subject, trafficking involving children is becoming a growing concern. Anecdotal evidence—such as a father's attempt to hide heroin in his children's shoes and the discovery of three kilos of opium tied to the thighs of three children, ages 9 to 13, traveling with their mother—indicates that the involvement of children in the drug trade has grown dramatically. Likewise, anecdotal evidence suggests a link between the rise in the drug trade and the increase in domestic violence and family crime in Central Asia. The Central Asian press has printed some of the more sensational instances: one Central Asian, Oleg Bukharev, reportedly killed his mother over money to buy narcotics; another, Imom Shakirov, killed and burnt his wife; and individuals reportedly have been brought to court for killing siblings over drugs.⁴⁶

But such stories are rarely covered in the press, and the scale, dynamics, and details of these links are difficult to confirm. Indeed, reports on domestic violence in Central Asia, which often link alcohol consumption to the act of violence, rarely mention drugs. Some Western anthropologists have suggested that this is due to the traditional acceptance of drug use for medicinal purposes; to the fact that social and cultural stigmas make women more unwilling to discuss these problems publicly; and/or to the fact that it is not a subject for debate when, in some regions, the revival of traditional norms means

that women are often considered the property of their husbands in the first place.⁴⁷

Ironically, the situation of women in drug production in Afghanistan may be different, but no less controversial. In contrast to the severely circumscribed role of Afghan women in most economic sectors, women play wide-ranging roles in the various stages of opium poppy cultivation. They participate in planting, weeding, thinning, lancing the capsules, collecting the opium, clearing the fields, breaking the capsules/removing and cleaning the seed, and processing by-products such as oil and soap.⁴⁸

According to a recent UN report, despite its numerous detrimental social costs, many women still regard opium poppy cultivation positively because it opens up economic possibilities for them in the absence of other money-earning opportunities. In an ODCCP survey in northern Afghanistan, for example, 75 percent of women respondents “supported the decision to cultivate opium poppy.” Only 5 percent viewed the cultivation as “negative.” “If there isn’t poppy cultivation,” one woman said, “poor women will have to work as servants in someone else’s house. I myself would prefer to die of lack of food. I do not want to work as a servant.”⁴⁹

But other interviews with women in Afghanistan suggest a different view. Growing poppy, according to one, “is dirty. . . . It is hard work. We are tired . . . and the labor is expensive and difficult to find.” According to this report, Afghan women also view the feeding and sheltering of needed hired laborers as an added burden on their domestic responsibilities. And they lament the increased violence and land disputes in the villages due to the drug trade, as well as a growing addiction problem among Afghan youth.⁵⁰

Role of Western Programs

Few Western programs to date have looked at the broader societal costs of the drug trade. Western law enforcement programs view their mandate as transferring interdiction capabilities, and encouraging high incarceration rates and the harsh sentencing of offenders. How these policies affect gender, human rights, or other social issues is clearly secondary. ODCCP has been one of the few organizations to focus on “the social dimension to drug control” through studies on female drug use and women and opium poppy cultivation.⁵¹ Yet few, if any, organizations (including ODCCP) have incorporated gender, human rights, or other social issues into the implementation of interdiction programs.

Observers and participants in these programs state that Western trainers likewise tend to turn a blind eye to human rights abuses when they interfere with the main goals of interdiction.⁵² On the other hand, few programs concerned with human rights, conflict prevention, and gender issues give more than cursory attention to problems asso-

ciated with narcotics trafficking. Most Western gender programs focus on other areas (such as poverty alleviation, domestic violence, and economic discrimination) that are considered more immediate or larger scale. As one World Bank official put it, off the record, “We have not identified drug trafficking as a serious issue for women. . . . The reaction typically has been that it is young men who are at risk.”

Some of this may be changing. ODCCP and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), one of the key organizations dealing with human rights as well as a range of other concerns in Central Asia, have begun efforts to coordinate more closely on the ground. The two organizations held a joint conference on “Enhancing Security and Stability in Central Asia” in October 2000 in Tashkent to discuss developing an “integrated approach to counter drugs, organized crime, and terrorism.” ODCCP states that it has recently instituted an educational project on prevention through the mass media and public events, and that the economic and social information they have gathered can be used more effectively to structure future programs. U.S. aid programs have begun to initiate seminars on promoting drug free schools, including “tips” on fighting drug trafficking. The Open Society Institute has financed needle exchanges and other harm reduction programs in Central Asia. Central Asian community leaders have urged consideration of broader educational programs, with some arguing that programs should be targeted particularly at women and girls. Most of these efforts, however, are in their infancy, with the bulk of energy and resources still focused on traditional interdiction programs.

Drug Trafficking

Photographs by Hans-Jürgen Burkard



A Russian border guard scans the Panj River, the porous border between Tajikistan and Afghanistan through which great quantities of drugs flow.



In a Tajikistan village near the Afghanistan border, Russian border guards apprehend and interrogate two young men. A bag of heroin lies open in the foreground.



The two young men are arrested and held in detention.



Tajikistan authorities burn bags of seized heroin and opium.



Russian customs official watches over a suspected drug smuggler from Dushanbe, Tajikistan. The suspect was administered an enema in the search for drugs.



Russian border troops in Tajikistan arrest two men trying to bring cash into Afghanistan, allegedly to purchase narcotics.

Changing dynamics in the region require a reassessment of how counternarcotics programs fit into the larger societal picture.

Conclusions and Recommendations

For now, then, the combination of politics and profit in the drug trade raises serious questions about assessing the consequences of Western programs. In light of the high stakes and high profits involved, how does one evaluate interdiction efforts when governments do not always share a Western agenda and may have a vested interest in keeping part of the drug trade vibrant? How does one know if programs are helping governments to eradicate drug smuggling across the board—or helping one “cartel” to eliminate another? How can one evaluate whether training programs are helping to create more honest, efficient law enforcement—or are only empowering officials involved in trafficking to smuggle better?

How should one evaluate the impacts of training and equipment transfers when the number of drug seizures by Western-trained law enforcement might rise, but so, too, might the human rights abuses associated with interdiction? How useful are new laws if there are few mechanisms to enforce them? Do new courts provide new opportunities for justice to be served, or only new tools for state crackdowns? Does the provision of more equipment to law enforcement—widely viewed as corrupt—run the danger of further strangling citizens’ rights? And if Western donors have supported programs to strengthen

drug control in railway stations and airports, why have corruption, strip searches, and abuses of human rights increased so dramatically in precisely those locations?

Ultimately, how can programs be reshaped so that all of these concerns are minimized?

Such questions lie at the heart of our recommendations. Certainly changes in the region call for a serious reconsideration of overall policy toward Afghanistan and Central Asia in the future, and the role of narcotics trafficking in that overall relationship. Policymakers will have to consider where drug trafficking fits in any reconstruction of Afghanistan, both among the West's allies, such as the Northern Alliance, and among the West's foes. They will have to consider what is required for the international community to help place Afghanistan's economy on a sustainable footing so that drug trafficking is no longer an essential ingredient, and where drug trafficking will fit in the changing relationships with the Central Asian states.

As other OSI reports have highlighted, changes in the region also require a reassessment of the balance between interdiction efforts on the one hand and demand reduction initiatives and harm reduction programs on the other. Past experience in other parts of the world and current experience in Afghanistan today demonstrate that supply reduction cannot work without a concurrent reduction in demand. And changing dynamics in the region require a reassessment of how counternarcotics programs fit into the larger societal picture.

Many of the challenges presented here, however, also reflect the need to fundamentally rethink how programs are designed and implemented rather than just the overall goals which they are intended to support. While we have made some of the following recommendations over the past several years regarding U.S. assistance as a whole, they are particularly important with regard to international counternarcotics programs, where the stakes have become so high.⁵³

With this in mind, key recommendations include the following:

► **Make narcotics trafficking in this region a higher priority in U.S. policy.** Drug trafficking must be made a higher priority in U.S. policy in the region today, and in any post-conflict reconstruction in Afghanistan. This is necessary not only because of drug trafficking's destructive impact in Central Asia, Russia, Western Europe, and beyond, but also because of its use in funding regional terrorist organizations. A commitment to eradicate narcotics trafficking should also be applied evenly. In a troubled region of shifting alliances, it is irresponsible to tolerate trafficking, as in the past, among the West's allies, while cracking down on the West's foes.

- ▶ **Avoid viewing counternarcotics programs and policies in a foreign policy vacuum.** The decision of the U.S. government, for example, to reward the Taliban for its ban on opium poppy cultivation with a \$43 million payment in the spring of 2001 seemed oddly out of place in light of the overall relationship between the two countries and the activities of the Taliban government at that time. Incentives should be tailored to the overall relationship, with more control over how those incentives are carried out.

- ▶ **Treat narcotics trafficking as a development as well as law enforcement issue.** Narcotics trafficking should not be viewed as a law enforcement challenge alone, but as an overall development challenge that cuts to the very heart of the Central Asian economies. For example, development aid for post-Taliban Afghanistan should include as a specific goal the reduction of farmers' dependence on opium production. Drug trafficking is a cross-cutting issue that cannot be addressed in terms of law enforcement alone.

- ▶ **Direct greater resources into assessing problems surrounding drug trafficking.** This includes far more nuanced and long-term assessments of the link between the drug trade and human rights, gender, local economies, and other societal issues, and of the informal workings of corruption as related to the drug trade itself. Although donors have long been criticized for conducting too many studies, this information is critical for designing and monitoring current programs and for evaluating their effects on society.

- ▶ **At the program level, require impact statements for all projects.** Counternarcotics programs should be required to produce formal "impact statements" (similar to environmental impact statements required from industry) that detail the potential societal impacts of individual programs, and how these issues will be addressed in project design, implementation, and monitoring. These statements should be open to public scrutiny, and should be used in evaluations during and after completion of projects.

- ▶ **Make protection of human rights an explicit and higher priority in international counternarcotics assistance.** In particular, attention should be paid to the consequences of donor programs designed only to increase interdiction rates. Donors should assess the extent to which this opens the door to further bribery and corruption and to illegal methods of interrogation. And they should determine whether the development of quotas prompts a crackdown mainly on low-level drug traffickers, often women; whether it encourages the practice of planting drugs and pushing through convictions based on trumped-up charges; whether the focus on interdiction rates further erodes the fairness of judicial proceedings in the interest of keeping convictions high; and whether overly severe sentencing guidelines contribute to growing incarceration rates in already overcrowded prisons, where infectious diseases such as tuberculosis are already rampant.

► **Increase resources for monitoring, oversight, evaluation, and follow-up.** More resources should be provided for effective follow-up and a continued presence on the ground for all programs. International programs that help develop new legislation, establish special drug courts, provide equipment, and train law enforcement officers must be closely monitored to ensure equipment and training are used as intended. While this should be done both through local oversight and by international personnel on the ground, ultimate responsibility for oversight and monitoring should lie with the donors who design and implement the programs.

► **Encourage the use of more regional and technical experts.** A better understanding of the informal dynamics of Central Asia is particularly important in programs addressing drugs, corruption, and crime. Yet many counternarcotics training programs are designed and implemented by law enforcement specialists with little, if any, prior experience in the region. Regional experts on these issues in Central Asia should be encouraged to work with technical experts to create programs that neither could do alone.

► **Improve coordination among donors and programs.** While important efforts have been made, more coordination among donors involved in counternarcotics should be encouraged. Likewise, coordination should be improved with other donor programs that address issues of rule of law, gender, human rights, and the social and economic causes behind increased drug trafficking.

► **Provide for greater transparency and inclusion of local communities.** Greater involvement of local communities—including local officials, village elders, grassroots NGOs, women, teenagers, etc., in addition to local elites—in designing, implementing, and monitoring counternarcotics initiatives would likely raise effectiveness while helping to diminish skepticism and criticism on the ground.⁵⁴

► **Support consistent, long-term funding.** UN and U.S. programs are hampered by erratic funding. More consistent and longer term funding should be a goal to support the recommendations above.

► **Promote harm reduction and the treatment of drug addiction.** Drug treatment and harm reduction programs, as well as education and public outreach programs, should be encouraged in order to reduce the harms associated with drug use and to support demand reduction as well as supply reduction.

Ultimately, more care must be taken to ensure that programs and policies are shaped to work effectively within the devastation and turmoil in Afghanistan, and the particular eco-

conomic, political, and cultural realities of the Central Asian countries themselves. This is particularly important in an area of the world already torn by enormous economic hardship, political repression, cultural upheaval, and religious, ethnic, and regional strife, and where economic despair has already been a breeding ground for terrorism and anti-Western sentiment. International assistance must reflect a deeper understanding of how counternarcotics programs fit into these broader societies so that programs designed to address a narrow set of problems do not inadvertently exacerbate other equally, if not more serious ills—both for these societies themselves and for the world as a whole.

Appendix One

Major Projects Sponsored by UN ODCCP in Central Asia and Afghanistan

The following are those projects highlighted by UN ODCCP and U.S. government agencies as their major counternarcotics projects in Central Asia and Afghanistan, and their stated goals for those projects.

Dollar amounts reflect targeted funding goals; no public information is available on actual expenditures.

CENTRAL ASIA PROJECTS

Institution building and improvement of control measures in Kyrgyzstan: \$550,000, May 1994

GOAL: To reduce the illicit supply of narcotic drugs and precursors in Kyrgyzstan. The project led to the establishment of the State Commission on Drug Control, with specialized units for the control of licit and illicit narcotics. Under this project, high level officials of the State Commission on Drug Control and officers of law enforcement agencies and the newly established forensic laboratories took part in domestic training programs and in international workshops and seminars to increase their skills.

Institution building, strategy development, and improvement of control measures in Uzbekistan: \$527,600, May 1994

GOAL: To create new counternarcotics institutions and strengthen existing ones in Uzbekistan and to provide expertise for the development of new drug control strategies. The project established a State Commission on Drug Control, introduced new concepts

of information analysis, and offered training programs in drug detection techniques and other areas. The forensic laboratory of the Ministry of Justice received modern laboratory equipment. The project promoted the use of drug-sniffing dogs.

Institution building and drug control measures in Turkmenistan: \$512,400, May 1996

GOAL: To establish and strengthen the Turkmenistan State Drug Control Coordination Committee, which coordinates activities of law enforcement bodies, the Customs Service, the Ministry of Health, border forces, the Ministry of Justice, and the Office of the Prosecutor General. The project promoted the establishment of the interministerial Drug Control Coordination Commission; introduced the concept of a central repository for the collection and analysis of drug-related information; improved law enforcement training and techniques; strengthened forensic laboratory services; and provided support to increase national drug interdiction capacities.

Institution building and drug control measures in Kazakhstan: \$984,000, of which

ODCCP \$773,900, government \$211,000, July 1996

GOAL: To assist the Kazakh government in strengthening national control measures by providing equipment and advisory services to the State Drug Control Commission and its Secretariat, as well as to drug control bodies in the Ministries of the Interior, Finance (State Revenues), Justice, Health, Education, and Agriculture and the National Security Committee. The project helped establish the National Inter-Agency Drug Enforcement Training Center to train drug enforcement agencies and launched the National Drug Forensic Laboratory.

Mapping the extent and monitoring of illicit cultivation in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan: \$742,600, July 1997 for two years

GOAL: To strengthen in-country and regional institutional capacities for the identification and measurement of illicit cultivation of hashish, marijuana, and opium poppies in the region. The project aimed to establish a practical methodology for continuous monitoring by participating governments. By the end of 1999, the project had successfully completed two illicit crop surveys in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan.

Strengthening law enforcement capacities and cross-border cooperation in the Central Asian region of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan: \$1.8 million, November 1997 for two years

GOAL: To build the interdiction capacity in three neighboring provinces in the border areas of Kyrgyzstan (Osh Province), Tajikistan (Murghab Province), and Uzbekistan (Andijan Province) by strengthening cooperation among the law enforcement operations of the

three states. At the end of the project, narcotics law enforcement agencies received modern detecting equipment, vehicles, and communications equipment. A total of 60 officers from the three countries received drug enforcement training.

Development of safe biological control methods for the eradication of illicit opium poppy and cannabis: \$495,000, February 1998 for three years

GOAL: To develop specific biological methods that can be used safely for the eradication of the opium poppy in the region. According to ODCCP, initial tests by scientists at the Institute of Genetics in Tashkent showed that the experimental fungus will destroy the opium poppy but not harm 130 indigenous species of animals and plants.

Masterplan for control of illicit drugs and organized crime in Kazakhstan: \$5.5 million, May 1999

GOAL: To support the Kazakh government in strengthening national control measures by providing advisory services, training, and logistic backup to drug control institutions. National drug control structures and institutions were created, in part, to facilitate better cooperation with other countries in the region. Project activities have included the improvement of forensic services through training and logistical support to the National Drug Laboratory.

Institution building, strategy development, and improvement of drug and crime control measures in Tajikistan: \$11.4 million, June 1999

GOAL: To help Tajikistan establish a specialized Drug Control Agency that will be responsible for all the major drug control activities in the country. The project aims to help the agency recruit new staff; provide the agency with financial resources, equipment, and training; and establish a monitoring mechanism in order to evaluate the agency's work.

Precursor control in Central Asia: \$5 million, January 2000 for three years

GOAL: To reduce the diversion of precursors and essential chemicals from manufacture and domestic distribution to illicit operations, thereby limiting the volume and extent of the illicit manufacture of heroin in Afghanistan. The project aims to review the current status of control measures, identify problems of diversion from international trade and from manufacture and domestic distribution, and establish procedures to prevent diversion.

Strengthening of Turkmen-Iranian/Turkmen-Afghan border control: \$7.7 million, 2000 for three years

GOAL: To support the government's efforts to limit the flow of drugs into Turkmenistan from Afghanistan by increasing the capability of border guards, customs, and law enforce-

ment bodies. The project provides technical assistance and equipment to assist border guards.

Strengthening control along the Tajik/Afghan border

GOAL: To strengthen law enforcement bodies' capacity to intercept drug trafficking in Tajikistan. The program seeks to improve forensic capacities in the country and assist in the formulation of policies for the storage, analysis, and destruction of narcotics seized in Tajik territory; promote an effective use of drug-sniffing dogs; assist in the launching of new training facilities; and strengthen drug control in railway stations and airports.

Strengthening control capacity of the Russian Federal Border Service along the border between Afghanistan and Tajikistan

GOAL: To strengthen control capacity of the Russian border forces deployed in Tajikistan through specialized equipment, strategic advice, and planning. The project seeks to expand a survey on drug trade between Afghanistan and Tajikistan. It aims to improve cooperation between Russian border troops in Tajikistan and the Tajik Drug Control Agency.

AFGHANISTAN PROJECTS

Drug control and rural rehabilitation: January 1989 – March 1996

GOAL: To publicize information and data on the cultivation, geographical distribution, and production of illicit drugs, and the prevalence of drug addiction in the areas of project operation. Also, to assist communities meeting their reconstruction requirements without resorting to the cultivation of illicit crops.

Monitoring of opium cultivation in Afghanistan: March 1994 – December 1996

GOAL: To undertake a survey of the extent of poppy cultivation in Afghanistan with a view to establishing a database for developing appropriate supply reduction strategies, as well as to develop a feasible methodology for the continuous monitoring of poppy cultivation.

Preparation of a future drug control strategy and program of assistance to Afghanistan: May 1995 – December 1997

GOAL: To undertake an in-depth analysis of all aspects of drug control in the context of the current economic, political, and social situation in Afghanistan; to facilitate the development of a future drug control strategy that would attract the participation of all interested donor countries and UN agencies.

Farmer-owned seed wheat cleaning, bagging, and storage in Nangarhar Province: April 1996 – November 1997

GOAL: To ensure a sustainable reduction in the illicit poppy cultivation in Nangarhar Province. According to ODCCP, the project assisted farmers by providing training and equipment, which enabled them to clean and store their high-yield wheat seed.

Drug control monitoring system: March 1997 – current

GOAL: To develop and implement a system for generating, storing, and disseminating drug control data. The project involves conducting surveys on the extent of opium poppy cultivation (and the related yield) in Afghanistan.

Poppy crop reduction: April 1997 – current, \$16 million support pledged

GOAL: To facilitate a sustainable reduction in the cultivation of opium poppy in high cultivation areas in Afghanistan and to develop a methodology for achieving this aim through sustainable rural development activities. The project was also intended to monitor the Taliban's compliance with the opium poppy cultivation ban.

Appendix Two

U.S. Government Agencies Funded by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

The State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) coordinates a range of federal agencies that provide training for Central Asian border guards, police, and judiciary. INL's total budget for Central Asia, 1998-2000, was as follows:

Kazakhstan, \$3,919,170
Kyrgyzstan, \$1,687,459
Tajikistan, \$1,027,673
Turkmenistan, \$1,571,019
Uzbekistan, \$3,153,926
Total: \$11,359,247

The 14 agencies, and examples of the programs as provided by these agencies, include:

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI): \$2,372,798

International Banking and Money Laundering
Public corruption
Community Oriented Policing
Environmental Crimes
Law Enforcement Safety and Survival
Law Enforcement Safety and Survival - Kits
Major Case Management
Law Enforcement Executive Development
White Collar Crime/ Financial Crimes

Crimes Against Children
Bombing Crime Scene Investigations
International Money Laundering
Crisis Management
Collection and Preservation of Crime Scene Evidence
Collection and Preservation of Crime Scene Evidence - Kits
Internal Controls
Mid-level Management
Computer Crimes
DNA Analysis
Advanced Organized Crime
National Academy Initiative
Violent Crimes (Profiling)
Serious Crimes (Homicide)

International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program (ICITAP): \$2,121,347

Human Development and the Police
Academy Development: Overview
Mid-Level Management
Senior Level Leadership/Management Course
Police Officer Survival and Train the Trainer
Police Transition
Internal Affairs Process

Office of Professional Development and Training (OPDAT): \$1,543,943

Judicial Training
Combating Economic Crime/Advanced Money Laundering & Asset Forfeiture
Investigating and Prosecuting Public Corruption
Investigating and Prosecuting Transnational Organized Crime
Developing Anticrime Task/Strike Forces
Criminal Procedure
Professional Responsibility and Ethics
Regional Prosecutor Training - Trafficking in Women and Children
Transnational Counternarcotics Investigations and Prosecutions
Drafting Legislation, Rules and Regulations
Extraordinary Criminal Events
Overview of Prosecuting Organized Crime

Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA): \$1,212,193

Drug Enforcement School, Basic and Advanced
Asset Forfeiture and Financial Investigations
Forensic Chemists
Airport Operations
Specialized Training: Precursor Chemical Diversion Investigations

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS): \$412,620

Immigration Training Development

DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY

Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF): \$1,211,149

International Firearms and Explosives Identification
Postblast Investigation Techniques
International Postblast Train the Trainer
International Firearms Trafficking
Assessment Trip for Forensic Labs
Establishment of Forensic Lab and Equipment
Country Postblast and Explosives Training Assessment

U.S. Customs Service (USCS): \$965,119

Integrity/Anticorruption
Intellectual Property Rights
Train the Trainer or Regional Train the Trainer
Passenger Interview and Vehicle Inspection Training
International Money Laundering Control
Overseas Enforcement Training Program
General Training - Budapest ILEA
In-Country Short-Term Advisory Programs
Contraband Enforcement Team Training
Passenger Enforcement Rover Training

Office of Tax Analysis: \$430,000

Intermittent Financial Advisor

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (FLETC): \$372,934

International Banking and Money Laundering
Computer Investigations and Security Training Program

U.S. Secret Service (USSS): \$120,000

Money Laundering and Financial Crimes

Combating Economic Fraud and Counterfeiting

Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN): \$37,800

Money Laundering

Creating the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU)

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Department of State's Bureau of Diplomatic Security (DS): \$295,841

VIP and Judicial Personnel Protection

International Travel Document Fraud Investigations

U.S. MILITARY

U.S. Coast Guard (USCG): \$164,959

Boarding Officer Course, Maritime Law Enforcement

Advanced Boarding Officer Course, Maritime Law Enforcement

Joint Boarding Officer, Maritime Law Enforcement

JUDICIARY

Federal Judicial Center (FJC): \$81,000

Seminar for Russian Judges and Legal Officials on Protection of IPR

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Department of Energy (DOE): \$9,344

ILEA Budapest Funding

FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD

Federal Reserve Board (FRB): \$8,200

Money Laundering

Notes

1. See other reports to OSI: http://www.eurasianet.org/policy_forum/epfo61301a.shtml.
2. Some experts assert that 50 or 60 percent of all drugs produced in Afghanistan are trafficked through Central Asia. See, for example, prepared testimony of Ralf Mutsche, assistant director, Criminal Directorate International Criminal Police Organization Interpol General Secretariat, before the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, December 13, 2000, for the 50 percent estimate; and U.S. Government Accounting Office, "Southwestern Asia Heroin Production," June 21, 2000, for the 60 percent estimate. These estimates are viewed as high, however, by other experts, such as Peter Reuter of the Rand Corporation (private communication to the authors).
3. See RFE/RL, "As Kyrgyzstan Calculates Drug Barons' Profits," October 20, 2000. The international drug trade is estimated to produce \$400 billion per year for criminal syndicates. This figure is nearly as much money as the international tourist industry generates.
4. John Pomfret, "Drug Trade Resurgent in Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, October 23, 2001.
5. Harry Maurer, ed., "The Right Moves Aren't Working . . . So The Drug Trade is Roaring," *Business Week*, June 23, 1997.
6. Barbara Crossette, "Afghan Heroin Feeds Addiction in Region, UN Report Declares," *New York Times*, February 29, 2000, and John Pomfret, "Drug Trade Resurgent in Afghanistan," *Washington Post*, October 23, 2001 report estimates of \$40-50 million/ year. The UN ODCCP estimates the farmgate value of the 2000 crop of opium at roughly \$91 million. See ODCCP, 2000 Annual Poppy Survey.
7. See, for example, Tamara Makarenko, "Kyrgyzstan and the Global Narcotics Trade," *Eurasianet*, December 8, 1999, and prepared testimony of Ralf Mutsche, assistant director, Criminal Directorate International Criminal Police Organization Interpol General Secretariat, before the House Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, December 13, 2000. As Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz Kamilov stated in October 2000: "It is becoming clear that one of the aims behind the invasions was to create drug corridors and maintain political instability as a key condition for successful narcotics business." Reuters, "Drugs and Violence Meet in Central Asia," October 21, 2000.
8. Statement by Asa Hutchinson, administrator, DEA, in congressional testimony before the House Government Reform Committee, Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, October 3, 2001.
9. See, for example, Tim Golden, "Afghan Ban on Growing of Opium Is Unraveling," *New York Times*, October 22, 2001.
10. As Peter Reuter notes, the totals seized are a trivial fraction of even low-end estimates of trans-shipment volumes. Peter Reuter, op. cit.
11. E-mail communication to the authors from ODCCP personnel based in Central Asia and subsequent private discussions with ODCCP personnel.
12. See Nancy Lubin, "Central Asia's Drug Bazaar," *New York Times*, op. ed., November 16, 1992, and Tim Golden, "Afghan Ban on Growing of Opium is Unraveling," *New York Times*, October 22, 2001.
13. For example, DOD jointly operates separate counterproliferation programs with the FBI and the U.S. Customs Service. The projects work with border guards to prevent the potential proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The programs provide equipment, training, and infrastructure support to develop and strengthen border security protection, interdiction, and enforcement capabilities of customs, border guards, and other border security and law enforcement organizations. Other U.S. assistance programs intended for the military seek to complement these programs. The DOD Cooperative Threat Reduction/Defense and Military Contacts Program features exchanges of information among military personnel, especially those involved in border defense. The Partnership for Peace (PFP) program offers equipment and exchange possibilities for border guards. And the International Military Education and Training (IMET) program provides a range of training opportunities, including English language lessons to military officers.
14. Between 1992 and 1999, INL received approximately \$12.6 million to carry out projects in the region, or less than 16 percent of the roughly \$80.5 million allocated to the NIS as a whole. Most of the funds to Central Asia were allocated in 1998-2000, reaching a peak of \$4.4 million in 1998, and subsequently declining by almost half, to \$2.5 million in 2000.

15. Of the estimated 18 tons of heroin consumed in the United States, roughly only one ton originates from Afghanistan. Although Colombia produces only 2 percent of the world's heroin supply, it provides an estimated 75 percent of the U.S. market.
16. Off-the-record discussions with and presentations by U.S. officials. See also John Pomfret, op. cit.; Representative Bill McCollum, statement before the Judiciary Committee, Subcommittee on Crime, for estimates that the IMU may be responsible for 70 percent of the heroin trafficked through Central Asia; and Scott Peterson, "Fabled Silk Road Road Now Paved with Narcotics," *Christian Science Monitor*, January 8, 2001, on the IMU's successful use of terrorism to secure drug conduits for large financial gain.
17. State Department officials say this is due to an administrative glitch, but there has been little movement in the process.
18. Statements for nonattribution by ODCCP personnel at the OSI Eurasia Policy Forum, June 13, 2001, and in private discussion with the authors.
19. The total amount of narcotics seized in Kyrgyzstan, for example, rose from about 3,500 kilograms in 1999 to about 5,400 in 2000—a trend similar to that throughout Central Asia. Reuters, January 29, 2001.
20. Barbara Crossette, "Taliban's Ban on Growing Opium Poppies is Called a Success," *New York Times*, May 18, 2001.
21. Tamara Makarenko, *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 12, No. 11, November 1, 2000. At the global level, this is what ODCCP reports in the 2000 *World Drug Report*.
22. See, for example, Tamara Makarenko, *Eurasia Insight*, 12/8/99, op. cit., and Makarenko, "Terrorism and Religion Mask Drug Trafficking in Central Asia," *Jane's Intelligence Review*, Vol. 12, No. 11, Nov. 1, 2000; and Interfax, "Heroin Traffickers Change Routes," December 14, 2000. In 1998, Makarenko notes, the director of Kyrgyzstan's State Committee on Drug Control estimated that only 5 percent of the opium passing through his country was caught; high-end estimates today range from 10 to 15 percent.
23. See, for example, U.S. Office of Drug Control Policy, "Drug Policy Perspectives—Central and Southwest Asia," <http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/policy/voabk.html>.
24. ODCCP Executive Director Pino Arlacchi agrees, in part, with criticisms that the international community has failed to take sufficient action to stop drug trafficking in Central Asia and Afghanistan. In October 2000, Arlacchi stated: "If we do not convert the last 10 years of talk into concerted action, we may find that the price to pay later is a much higher one." Reuters, "Drugs and Violence Meet in Central Asia," October 21, 2000.
25. For example, by U.S. experts, including in the U.S. State Department, and also as reflected in the decision of a number of countries to withdraw their support after initially showing interest in funding these projects.
26. See, for example, presentation by Tony White, former chief of the Supply Reduction and Law Enforcement Section of the UN International Drug Control Program, OSI Eurasia Policy Forum, Washington, DC, June 13, 2001. "Despite public exposure. . .that this research was extending to the development of more virulent strains and that there was a possibility that the fungus could mutate and attack other crops, this project has continued, mainly as a result of pressure exerted upon UN ODCCP by the U.S. Government in the early part of this year." http://www.eurasianet.org/policy_forum/epfo61301a.shtml
27. See, for example, RFE/RL, "More than 5 Tons of Drugs Seized in 2000," *Kyrgyz News*, January 30, 2001. According to Tony White, the UN inspector general, in a report of June 11, 2001, called the numbers presented in the UN's *World Drug Report* ". . . beyond the limits of credibility." See Tony White, op. cit.
28. See survey results from Central Asian law enforcement personnel and the general population in Nancy Lubin, *Central Asians Take Stock: Reform, Corruption and Identity*, U.S. Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, February, 1995. See also, for example, INL 1999 report (op. cit.) or Scott Peterson, "Fabled Silk Road Now Paved With Narcotics," op. cit.
29. Global Threat to the U.S., p. 63.
30. For broader description, see Nancy Lubin, "New Threats in Central Asia and the Caucasus: An Old Story with a New Twist," *Russia's Total Security Environment*, Institute for East/West Studies, NY, 1999.
31. See examples in Nancy Lubin, "Corruption and Organized Crime in Central Asia," testimony before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, U.S. Congress, March 23, 2000.
32. Tony White, op. cit.
33. As discussed below, U.S. bilateral programs and ODCCP programs are rarely implemented in close collaboration with one another, leading to duplication in programs and unnecessary expenditure of additional resources. And rarer still is coordination between counternarcotics programs and other related programs (such as in rule of law, democracy building, etc.) provided by other agencies and departments.


34. For a more detailed discussion of all of these issues in U.S. assistance to the NIS, see *Aid to the Former Soviet Union: When Less is More*, JNA Associates, Inc., March 1996 and forthcoming update.
35. L'observatoire Geopolitique Des Drogues, *The World Geopolitics Of Drugs* 1995/96, annual report.
36. For a fuller discussion of this issue, see Tatiana Bozrikova et al., "Women and Drugs in Tajikistan," Open Society Institute Assistance Foundation – Tajikistan, February 2001, and Erika Dailey, "Drug Searches and Human Rights Violations on the Tajikistan Border," *Eurasianet* (<http://www.eurasianet.org>), February 18, 2000, and "Governmental and International Responses to Human Rights Abuses at Tajikistan's Border Crossings," *Eurasianet*, May 16, 2000.
37. Sultan Jumagulov, "On the Uzbek-Kyrgyz border, travelers run the gauntlet of unmarked minefields and constant police harassment," Bishkek, IWPR No. 35, January 9, 2001.
38. Elmira Shishkaraeva, private communication to the authors. According to Peter Reuter, this figure is similar to that in the United States but higher than that typical in Asia. Peter Reuter, op. cit.
39. Interview with Colonel Raimberdiyev by Correspondent A. Galunichev as reported by the BBC Monitoring Service, May 15, 2001.
40. Bozrikova, op. cit.
41. Private communications to the authors.
42. Private communications in February, 2001, to the author from a Tajik analyst who requested anonymity.
43. Bozrikova, op. cit.
44. See paper presented by Martina Vandenberg at the Open Society Institute's February 2001 Eurasia Policy Forum, Washington, DC. The paper is available at http://www.eurasianet.org/policy_forum/epfo22001.shtml.
45. Erika Dailey, "Governmental and International Responses to Human Rights Abuses at Tajikistan's Border Crossings," op.cit.
46. See, for example, *Domestic Violence in Uzbekistan*, Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights, December, 2000, and Vasila Inoyatova, *Sbornik soobshchenii o narusheniakh prav cheloveka v Uzbekistane za period oktiabr-fevral 2000-2001 gg.* (Collection of Materials on Human Rights Violations in Uzbekistan from October 2000 through February 2001), Tashkent, 2001.
47. Off-the-record interviews with local women and Western anthropologists working in, and on, Central Asia.
48. ODCCP: Afghanistan, "The Role of Women in Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan," Islamabad, Pakistan, June 2000, p. 3. The report notes that because women consider poppy cultivation as "long and arduous work," many would welcome the opportunity to earn money in other ways. As part of the poppy reduction program in Afghanistan, ODCCP in 1997 sought to build a textile factory to employ 800 women; but this proposal was rejected by the Taliban as a violation of Islamic Law. See *Narcotics Report*, 1997.
49. Ibid.
50. See Anna M. Pont, *Blind Chickens and Social Animals*, Mercy Corps, August, 2001.
51. See, for example, ODCCP's study "Afghanistan: The Role of Women in Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan," op.cit., as well as other ODCCP reports. Despite programs such as the textile factory, there appears to be a disconnect between these studies and ODCCP's interdiction programs where there is little evidence that women and family issues are taken into account in their design or implementation.
52. Private communications to the authors and their first-hand experience in these programs.
53. See Nancy Lubin., "U.S. Policies in Central Asia," congressional testimony before the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Committee on International Relations, March 17, 1999; and "Aid to the Former Soviet Union," op. cit.
54. This is particularly important in creating more oversight over law enforcement. In some areas of Central and South America, for example, police and community residents have agreed on a common protocol for police action and accountability; some communities also increased the number of female police officers or created police stations staffed only by women. Central Asian communities could build on these or other approaches.

Biographies of the Authors

Nancy Lubin is president of JNA Associates, Inc., and a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council. She has worked throughout Central Asia and the Caucasus for almost 30 years—as a congressional staffer, an associate professor at Carnegie Mellon University, and now for JNA—and consults for international donors, corporations, the media, and others. She was a fellow at the Wilson Center, the U.S. Institute of Peace, and elsewhere, and is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, the Board of Trustees of the Eurasia Foundation, the Board of Advisors of the OSI Central Eurasia Project, and other organizations. She holds a Ph.D. from Oxford University and a B.A., magna cum laude, from Harvard University; studied at the universities of Moscow and Leningrad; and was one of the first Westerners to conduct doctoral research in Soviet Central Asia, where she worked for one year at Tashkent State University, Uzbekistan (1978-79). She is the author of several books and monographs, congressional reports and testimony, and scholarly and popular articles on this part of the world, as well as op-ed articles in the *New York Times* and elsewhere.

Alex Klaitis is a senior consultant at JNA Associates, Inc., and currently beginning work with humanitarian aid projects in Central Asia. He was formerly the partnership and exchange program manager at the Initiative for Social Action and Renewal in Eurasia (ISAR), where he worked on establishing partnerships between NGOs in the United States and the former USSR. He worked for three years in Kyrgyzstan, 1995-1998, first as a Peace Corps volunteer and then as country director for the American Councils for International Exchange. He has an M.A. in Russian and East European Studies from Stanford University and a B.A. in history from Vassar College.

Igor Barsegian is a senior consultant at JNA Associates, Inc., and a research associate at the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at George Washington University. He completed an M.A. program at the Johns Hopkins University and holds an advanced degree from the Soviet Academy of Sciences in Armenia, where he taught anthropology before coming to the United States. He has taught courses in anthropology and history at George Washington University and Goucher College since 1997. His publications cover diverse issues of methodology, political culture, nationalism, and foreign policy with the area focus on Eastern Europe and Eurasia.



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